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FBIS-EEU-95-117 *19 June 1995*

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Bildt: Maintaining B-H Arms Embargo Essential

AU1706195895 Paris AFP in English 1937 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Visby, Sweden, June 17 (AFP)—European Union (EU) mediator Carl Bildt said Saturday it was essential to maintain the arms embargo in former Yugoslavia to avoid a bloodbath there.

"The international arms embargo must be maintained at all costs," he said. "That is the condition (underlying) the UN presence, humanitarian operations and political mediation."

If the embargo were lifted, "the consequences would be catastrophic," and "we would witness a bloodbath for a very long time," he added on a visit to this port on the southern Swedish island of Gotland.

However, Bildt, Sweden's prime minister from 1991 to 1994 and the new Eu mediator on the former Yugoslavia after Lord Owen, said that no country was seriously thinking of lifting the embargo.

"When I went to the United States a year ago, that idea was being seriously put forward then, but now people have realized they cannot go down that path," he added.

"We have witnessed an escalation (of the crisis) since the cease-fire ran out (in Bosnia) in April, and that will continue for some time," said Bildt, who is due in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, next week.

Zotov Says Russia 'Dissatisfied' With Karadzic

AU1806200695 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jun 95 pp 5-6

[Interview with Aleksandr Zotov, Russian representative in the Contact Group, by Sabiha Hadzimuratovic; place and date not given: "Russia Is a Great Friend of Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hadzimuratovic] Mr. Zotov, what are the prospects for the Contact Group's plan?

[Zotov] I have not been involved in the peace process, which is neither simple nor easy, from the very beginning. There have been many plans—for example, the one Lord Owen proposed. Many of them were not accepted, some were signed and some were not, one side insisted on one aspect of the plan, the other side insisted on something else. The same happened in this case. I believe that any plan made from the outside will not be ideal for those who are on the inside and who are interested in it essentially. It has to be a compromise, a balance. No side can be 100-percent satisfied. The reason for that is simple: People from the outside have to impose something on those on the inside, and that might not suit them. The proposed plan is the only existing plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do not think the international community has enough endurance and patience to propose another plan.

[Hadzimuratovic] The people and the government of Bosnia- Herzegovina have agreed to the Contact Group's plan. Even though Bosnia is 31 percent Serb, they would get 49 percent of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory. One might say: You have rewarded the Serbs, who have committed genocide over the Bosniak people. And the Serbs did not even agree to this plan, which rewards them.

[Zotov] In conflicts like this, there are no angles, and I am not in a position to judge. I want to say that I do not intend to wash the guilt off the Serbs or adorn the Serb side. I have not witnessed the crimes, but I have heard about them, just like the other side. Therefore, I cannot talk about reward or punishment or about those who are on the right side or the wrong side.... But, when one talks about the division of territory, people tend to confuse two things. Serb ultranationalists also pose the question: Is it fair to give a national state to the Croats if one knows that they cooperated with the Nazis and participated in crimes against the Serbs? However, we do not need such questions. We have to turn to the future. We have to turn to Bosnia. It has to start living as a state of three nations, without losers or winners and without the punished ones or the rewarded ones.

[Hadzimuratovic] But Mr. Zotov, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government has always remained true to the basic principles of our young, modern state: that the three nations must live in harmony, in a multinational, multicultural, and multireligious milieu. And that is the opinion of most Bosnians.

[Zotov] The most important thing for the Bosnians is to create a state in which all nations can live happily and well. However, I often point out that this is the biggest problem for the Bosniaks. For them, there is no easy solution. They are really committed to the integrity and indivisibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They form and identify themselves as the Bosnian nation. The other two nations have alternatives. They look across the border as their eventual way out or even a solution. They believe that uniting with those countries would be their national choice, so the Bosniaks have a heavy task—to create such an atmosphere in Bosnia that would enable other nations to live in an indivisible, multinational, multireligious country.

[Hadzimuratovic] Bosnians are also of Slavic origin, and their language, customs, and culture are closer to Russia's than to those of the United States. How come we expect more help from them than from you? Had you wanted, you could have stopped the war three years ago. Why did you not do it?

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[Zotov] The spring offensive of your army was a mistake, just like the decision to end the cease-fire. Karadzic's decision not to accept the plan was also a mistake. It brings no good to his people. That is the biggest obstacle to peace. In Pale I told Karadzic that there would be no progress if he continued the killing of civilians. He is simply not able to understand some things. The territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be superficial and artificial if people know how to live together. Bosnia can be an undivided country instead of a country divided by trenches. For example, cantons were a much more acceptable solution for Bosnia, in my opinion, but unfortunately that was not accepted. This plan is also not a clear clinical case. It is not a matter of mathematics. There must be a delicate balance.... I would remind you once more of the spring offensive. The Bosniaks should not have initiated any new fighting.

[Hadzimuratovic] That means that you believe we can liberate our territory without fighting if the Serbs do not accept any peace plan?

[Zotov] But that has turned out to be counterproductive. The intention was to provoke stupid and inadequate reactions from Karadzic and then bring in a foreign power—for example, NATO—and, thus, in a way accomplish victory. Tactically, that could have been a good plan, but, after all, that is again the continuation of the war. A political solution and negotiations are pushed aside.

[Hadzimuratovic] The Bosnian Government has drained the logic of negotiating with Karadzic. It has signed all peace plans, while the Serbs have not signed any of them. You are the only country in the UN Security Council that always supports and encourages them. We know, just as you know, that without your help they could not have done anything.

[Zotov] If you believe that we support the Pale Serbs, you are mistaken. I have never supported Pale or Karadzic or his government. I also believe that there is not a single case in which our government showed it was moving closer to the Pale Serbs. We regret to see our Slavic brothers killing one another. We are thoroughly dissatisfied with Karadzic. We are always trying to get his feet back on the ground.

[Hadzimuratovic] But you are the country that always opposes air strikes against his military positions.

[Zotov] I am going to tell you something because I hope that, as an honest journalist, you will publish it. Russia is the country that helps Bosnia the most: politically and materially, particularly Sarajevo. We invested over $120 million in gas supplies. That is more money than you got from any country, in either the East or the West. We have recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina and established official relations with it. We are the only country that used its influence and convinced Milosevic to distance himself from the Bosnian Serbs and to close the borders. Who has done more for you, and yet you are not satisfied with us? Those are the facts that show that Russia is a great friend of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fact that we did not stop the war there—we are not able to do everything. We did not stop the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, either. There are other long-lasting wars in the world, and sometimes the world community is unable to stop them. For example, the way it was in Lebanon for 16 years.

[Hadzimuratovic] Can you tell us about the attitude of your government toward the Serb bombing of the "protected" zones and their taking UN soldiers as hostages?

[Zotov] On the one hand, that is uncontrolled and wild of Karadzic, and, on the other, it is canny. Who is better—those who provoke or those who inadequately react? Only the civilians on both sides suffer and long for peace. The war should be stopped as soon as possible, and you should live together. Your country has European principles and values. In the Contact Group, when we talk about Bosnia, we say that it must be a community of equal peoples. Do you want to create a country based on some other principles and qualities? For example, if you say: We will have the country with a Muslim government, the first to object will not be Milosevic but Tudjman. I can understand the wish of your people to fight and your arguments, but that leads to no good.... The Bosnian Government does not have enough confidence in the international plan. It also sees only the fact that someone has occupied 70 percent of its country. There is frustration. I understand the words of Mr. Silajdzic, but, if the Bosnians want a better future, unique borders, and a big state, they have to think of the balance. If not, there is another project for your country, which we do not accept or advocate—the disintegration of Bosnia as a state. What has happened, for example, with the Croat part of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Croatian money and Croatian laws have been established. That is a continuation of Croatia. On the Serb side, less of that can be seen, exactly because of Milosevic's behavior. The "Serbian Republic" is certainly a quasi-state that the Serbs want to promote into their proper state. Those are some possibilities and dangers. We know that we have problems with Pale. For me, Bosnia was a proper Yugoslavia in small, more than any other of your republics. It was like a diamond in the middle with its wonderful varieties—various customs, cultures, and religions. There are still many people who want

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to have such a Bosnia and who find it boring to live surrounded by only one nation and one culture. That is a value for me as well. That is the only hope for you, the togetherness. I do not base my feelings and judgment on Karadzic's ultranationalistic ideas or on the military-pragmatic ideas of General Mladic. Military operations are not the solution.

[Hadzimuratovic] Is diplomatic pressure being exerted on Milosevic to recognize Bosnia?

[Zotov] If you exert pressure on Milosevic, you will make a Karadzic out of him or replace him with Seselj. He wants to be ready for a normalization of relations with Bosnia. That is what I always say to my Bosnian friends who want to replace Karadzic and Milosevic. One should be canny and clever and create better positions for Milosevic so as to make him useful for future dialogue. Then the Bosnian part of the Serbian people would join the peace process.

[Hadzimuratovic] Bosnians do not identify all Serbs with Karadzic. After all, he is not a Serb and comes not from Bosnia but from Montenegro. In the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, there are also boys of Serbian nationality; in the Government and Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are Serbs committed to the undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is there any hope to replace Karadzic with someone from that part of Serb intelligence and politicians? If it is hard to talk with him, would it not be easier to talk with someone else?

[Zotov] Once there is more hope for peace, there will be more space for those who love Bosnia, those committed to togetherness and to the survival of the spirit of your country.

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Involvement in Rapid Deployment Force Discussed

AU1606133895 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 14 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by "(fp)": "The Defense Ministry Is Keeping Quiet About the Type of Involvement in the Intervention Unit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—According to Defense Minister Holan, the Czech Republic is interested in possible involvement in the "planning process for forming rapid deployment forces" for the former Yugoslavia. These forces, whose formation was agreed upon in Paris by the ministers of 15 EU and NATO countries, should help the UN peacekeeping units fulfill their tasks, but should not have broader jurisdiction than the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] units have now.

The defense minister's adviser, Ales Dolezal, refused to be more specific yesterday about the method of Czech involvement in forming a rapid reaction unit. "Dispatching our soldiers to such forces would be a long-term process, both executive and parliamentary, so our assistance may be of a nature other than the direct deployment of troops," said Dolezal. As far as expanding our unit in Croatia to include an engineering company is concerned—as the United Nations has already previously requested—two options, according to Dolezal, are being taken into consideration: restructuring the Czech battalion to boost its engineering expertise or increasing the size of the engineering part of our battalion above the limit of 1,000 men. "Of course, the two options need to be discussed in government and in parliament," commented Dolezal.

Joint Declaration on Sudeten Issue Drafted

95CH0267B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 6 Jun 95 pp 1, 5

[Article by Jan Stojaspal: "Bilateral Effort To Heal War Wounds"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A new joint initiative by the Czech Republic and Germany to achieve a lasting reconciliation over the Sudeten issue may emerge Thursday, June 1, in a speech by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Kohl is expected to touch on the sensitive issue of Czech-German postwar reconciliation and compensation for victims of fascism during a parliamentary address in Bonn.

He will acknowledge the contributions of Sudeten Germans who were driven from the former Czechoslovakia after World War II and also make a statement about victims of fascism, according to various sources.

Paul Hampel, a correspondent for German ARD television in Prague, said Kohl is likely to push for a prompt passage of a declaration condemning "violence before the end of the war and after it" and classifying both as crimes.

The declaration, which is being drafted collaboratively by the Czech and German legislatures, is seen as an atatempt to reconcile the two countries' still-acute feelings about wartime and postwar events. The declaration would have identical wording in both countries.

After a May 22 meeting with the German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, in Bonn, Josef Zieleniec, Czech minister of foreign affairs, told the Czech news agency CTK that the declaration "would open the way for many other activities, once the burden of the past is removed."

Czech parliamentary deputies began working on the declaration in early May but, at press time, had not settled on concrete wording, according to Roman Zamboch, a parliament spokesman.

Under the so-called Benes Decrees, some 2.5 million Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia after the war on charges of collaboration with the Nazi regime. Their property was confiscated. To this day, relations between the two countries are clouded by the affair.

While the Czech government so far refuses to question the legal and political outcome of the postwar arrangements, Zieleniec has come forward with other initiatives.

He proposes making Czech citizenship easier to obtain for Sudeten Germans and has supported establishing a "fund for the Czech-German future," a foundation that would finance projects to assist Czech victims of fascism.

Compensation is still the subject of negotiation, but Germany has recently expressed some willingness to offer financial assistance.

According to Jiri Pehe, director of the analytical research department at the Open Media Research Institute, the Czech Republic has finally realized that the Sudeten German issue could hinder the country's effort to join the European Union (EU).

"They realized they could get into the same situation as Slovenia," Pehe explained. "Slovenia confiscated Italian property after the end of the war and refused to restitute it. Italy (now) blocks even association negotiations (aimed at moving Slovenia toward EU membership)."

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Russian Pressure on Oil Privatization Reported

AU1606143395 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 15 Jun 95 p 16

[Article by Istvan Leko: "Russia Is Still Interested in the Refineries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In recent months, the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy has been dealing with its Czech counterpart in a manner reminiscent of the pre-November situation. This is apparent from documents that LIDOVE NOVINY has at its disposal.

At the March meeting between Y. K. Shafranik, Russian minister of fuel and energy, and Milan Cerny, Czech deputy trade and industry minister, the Russian minister said that, in issues of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic in the oil industry, the Czech side is—from the Russian side's point of view—proceeding in a manner that complicates relations between the two countries.

"The Russian side has reservations regarding the fact that the Czech side has offered participation in the privatization of the petrochemical industry to a consortium of Western companies (Agip, Conoco, Shell, and Total—editor's note); however, it has excluded the Russian side from this process. We have brought this issue to your attention several times; despite this, however, you went to seek an agreement with Western companies. In cooperation with the Russian Federation in the oil industry, the Czech side has for three years been behaving contrary to the way it should," said Shafranik during the talks. He added that he had only agreed with the protocol between the Russian and Czech Governments on long-term oil supplies to the Czech Republic, signed at the end of last year, on the basis of an instruction from the minister for foreign economic relations, Davydov.

According to Shafranik, the Russian side insists on its demand that it be able to participate in privatization of the Czech petrochemical industry. According to LIDOVE NOVINY's information, Deputy Minister Milan Cerny did not take exception to the method of negotiation.

Trade and Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy said to LIDOVE NOVINY in this context that we have to differentiate between the method of negotiation and the decision made by the Czechs. According to him, developments have shown that the Czech authorities never respond to Russian pressure by making concessions.

A year ago, when the government made a surprising decision in favor of privatizing the refineries by means of the so-called Czech way, Interior Minister Jan Ruml declared that the Czech way seemed to him more like a Russian way. Therefore, he had a report drawn up on the security and strategic risks associated with this decision. After he submitted this analysis to the cabinet members, they rejected the Czech way and described the Western IOC [expansion unknown] consortium as the strategic partner for the refineries. However, the negotiations with the IOC have to be concluded by 30 June. If no agreement is reached, the prospects for the representatives of the so-called Czech way will be reopened.

Poll: 'Majority' Dissatisfied With Situation

AU1606153295 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 13 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by "(jik)": "Most People Are Dissatisfied With the Political Situation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Constantly rising prices, high crime rate, disagreements among the political parties, and arrogance of politicians are the main reasons that the majority of people are dissatisfied with the current political situation. Despite this, in assessing the current and past regimes, an absolute majority of the public are inclined to believe that the current regime is better.

In the most recent poll conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research, only 39 percent of the respondents said that they have no reservations about the political situation. Fifty-two percent were of the opposite opinion. Those who are satisfied appreciate, in particular, the country's stability, freedom, democracy, and the state of the economy. On the other hand, roughly 8.0 percent of the population sees high prices as the biggest shortcoming. The crime rate, the conflicts among the political parties, and the arrogance of politicians were each described by 5.0 percent of the respondents as the main shortcomings.

People between 20 and 44 years old (45 percent), people with a university education (56 percent), and Civic Democratic Party supporters (79 percent) are more satisfied. On the other hand, pensioners (60 percent), blue-collar workers (61 percent), and Czech Social Democratic Party supporters (88 percent) are the most dissatisfied.

Polls Show Social Democrats Gaining on ODS

95CH0267A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 6 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by Jan Stojaspal: "Social Democrats Are Closing In on ODS"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] With elections a year away, the ruling party of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus is

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losing political ground to the opposition left-wing Social Democrats, according to recent voter-preference surveys.

Analysts say the surveys show—for the first time since the 1992 elections—that the pre-eminence of the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS) has been significantly challenged. But voter preferences have been fluctuating for both parties since last September.

A May survey conducted by the Center for Empirical Research (STEM) shows that after a popularity peak of 30 percent in February, the Civic Democrats have been losing favor.

The survey shows that 26 percent of the population would vote for the Civic Democrats. In September, that figure was 29 percent; in February, it was 30 percent. The survey also found that 22 percent would turn to the Social Democratic Party. That figure was 16 percent in September and 21 percent in February.

A Public Opinion Research Institute survey shows similar results.

The Civic Democrats are the leading party of the right-oriented government coalition. The Social Democrats are the second-largest left-wing party in parliament but the most popular left-wing party in the Czech Republic, according to the polls.

Civic Democrats might be forced to rethink their stance on social policy as a result of the recent surveys, said Jiri Pehe, director of the analytical research department at the Open Media Research Institute.

But at the same time, Pehe said he does not believe the Social Democrats have a serious shot at winning the 1996 elections and forming the next government. "It looks more like another term for Vaclav Klaus," he said.

Based on the poll results, the ruling coalition would actually win more parliamentary seats than it currently holds because some of the smaller parties are losing popularity and would not gather enough votes to be elected to parliament.

Some analysts cite recent corruption allegations and the government's tight-fisted social policies as key reasons for the shift in voter preferences. Pavel Simonik, a sociologist with STEM, said that the Social Democratic Party has not altered its policy, but the general political environment has changed.

"During the economic transformation, (the Civic Democrats) had all the trump cards—they could always point out achievements," he said. "But now, with the transformation almost finished, everybody is in the same position."

Karel Machovec, the Social Democrats' first deputy chairman, said his party will be fully satisfied only if it overtakes the Civic Democrats—who don't seem concerned.

"It's too early to speak about a trend," said Libor Novak, ODS deputy executive chairman. He said voters' preferences fluctuate monthly.

Annual Airports Conference To Be Held in Prague

95CH0267D Prague PRAGUE POST in English 6 Jun 95 p 12

[Article by Michele Kayal: "Region's Airports Need Funds for Expansion"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Financing the special needs of the region's airports will be the main topic at the annual conference of the European division of Airports Council International (ACI) to be held in Prague next month.

ACI Europe's 300 member airports handled 570 million passengers in 1994, and the organization expects air travel to increase roughly 6 percent annually over the next few years. To handle that growth smoothly, Europe's congested airports will need money. Last year, ACI's European airports spent 3 billion ECU ($3.48 billion) on new facilities. The airports are slated to invest 19 billion ECU between 1991 and 1997.

The 350 airport executives and CEO's expected at the June 7-9 event will discuss how to evaluate, finance, and manage investments. Conference organizers will distribute a handbook filled with case studies that identify sources of money and how best to win it. ACI Europe's representative said many future investments likely will focus on developing passenger capacity, building cargo centers, and bringing rail connections to the airports.

Prague airport officials, who are about to begin a $150 million terminal extension, said they expect hosting the conference to bring great benefits.

"It will bring attention to our airport," said Petr Rychetsky, international relations manager at the Czech Airport Authority. "We hope it might help increase the traffic and bring further connections with other European airports."

ACI Europe creates information exchanges and lobbies on behalf of its members, which cover Europe from Russia to the Canary Islands.

The organization sees Eastern Europe's airports as vital to the continent's future air travel. "They're key players in the developing economies and their integration into

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Europe," said an ACI spokeswoman. "It's essential that they get an efficient and up-to-date transport network."

Brian Unwin, chairman of the European Investment Bank, will deliver the keynote address. Airport and bank executives from across Europe will offer workshops, and Bertrand Millot, principal banker for the transport team at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, will host a seminar on funding airport investment in the East and Central European countries.

According to ACI, there's a big information gap between Western and Eastern airports, and there's a lot of expertise that can be exchanged.

Uranium Mining Declines; Subsidies Requested

95CH0267C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 6 Jun 95 p 12

[Article by Maggie Ledford Lawson: "Uranium-Mining Industry Losing Much of Its Shine"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech uranium-mining industry, a glowing success story for most of this century, has cooled off so much that only government subsidies can keep it alive.

Diamo, the company operating the mines, had intended to lay off workers May 4 at Dolni Rozinka, a mine in south Moravia. At the last minute, the government approved a 334 million Kc [Czech koruna] ($12.8 million) loan that will enable the operation to continue until the end of the year.

The layoffs had been considered because Diamo was producing more uranium than the Czech energy company CEZ needed, said Jan Kafka, director of the company.

"The financial situation of our company doesn't allow us to produce uranium for storage," he said.

Dolni Rozinka is the only uranium mine in the country utilizing traditional methods. The only other mine, at Hamr in the region of Ceska Lipa in north Bohemia, uses a method in which sulfuric acid is pumped into a shaft, diluting the uranium.

Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimir Dlouhy has said that the down-turn in the uranium industry has been more severe than in any other part of the mining industry. In 1989, Czech mines produced 2,400 tons of uranium and had more than 30,000 employees, Dlouhy said. This year's output is expected to be only about 300 tons, and fewer than 7,000 workers remain in the industry.

Dlouhy has pressed for higher subsidies to keep the mines going but hasn't persuaded the rest of the government.

The Czech uranium industry has a brilliant history, starting early in the century at such places as Jachymov, near the German border in north Bohemia, where Madame Marie Curie got the pitchblende that led to her discovery of radium.

The industry flourished as the atomic industry reached its height from the 1950's through the 1970's. Much of the metal went to the Soviet Union to serve in that country's arms buildup.

But Czech uranium is not of a quality to make it competitive on the world market, which is glutted with high-grade metal, said Miroslav Tvrznik, head of the nuclear-energy section at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The ore being mined here is only about 0.1 percent grade, while ores in Canada or Australia may be as rich as 7 percent to 8 percent, he said.

Uranium mining is hardly a strategic industry these days, said Tvrznik. "We only need it for our own nuclear power plants."

And at present, the Czech Republic operates only one power plant, at Dukovany in south Moravia. A second facility at Temelin, near Ceske Budejovice, had been expected to start up in the fall of 1996. However, construction is behind schedule, mired in political and funding difficulties. Government officials now are saying that the first reactor won't be on line until the spring of 1997 at the earliest.

"The delays in construction are a problem for our industry," said Diamo's Kafka.

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Kovac Views Relations With Meciar, Minorities

LD1806135995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0613 GMT 18 Jun 95

[From the regular "Sunday Journal" feature program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] We are now broadcasting an exclusive interview which our correspondent Gyorgy Batta Jr. made with President Michal Kovac. We hope, on the basis of the level-headed, considered remarks made by the president of the neighboring country, that we can gain encouragement for future cooperation.

[Batta] Mr. President, the relationship between you and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar has been tense for a long time. There has virtually ceased to be a dialogue between the two of you. What do you think is the reason for this?

[Kovac, in Slovak fading to Hungarian translation] I would like to begin by saying that this is a subject I do not like speaking about. At the outset we did not even agree about how the president should conduct himself—whether he should be committed to one party or movement for which he was candidate when running for president, whether he should be answerable to this movement, or whether he should behave as a president who really is above parties and acts on behalf of all of citizens.

We also had different opinions about how the executive power should manifest itself, and about the type of cooperation there should be between the opposition and the governing party. The constant confrontations, the attempts to discredit the opposition, were alarming. This later deteriorated to such an extent that there was talk about government style and about whether there could be any political cooperation at all—or, rather, there was talk about lack of political cooperation. In my speech to parliament in March 1994 I criticized what had been said. To this very day, our views on democracy and on exercising power within democratic frameworks are very different. [passage omitted]

[Batta] On several occasions Prime Minister Meciar has asked you to step down. He has even proposed that the citizens should decide on this in a referendum. Which of the two of you has the confidence of the majority? How would you view this proposal from the viewpoint of constitutionality?

[Kovac] I might note that the call for the president to step down is unusual, to put it mildly, and not only for me. I believe it would be difficult to support factually in parliament, since it would be difficult to prove that a president's actions constantly went against the country's sovereignty and constitutional framework, and were in favor of the country's territorial breakup.

It seems that the prime minister is unwilling to reconcile himself to me personally, and for this reason he seeks other means to oppose me. He spoke most recently about a referendum, as a possible means. The question is: What question would the referendum address? Many legal experts believe that if the question were phrased in terms of whether one wanted the president to step down, the referendum would not be constitutional.

[Batta] Hungarian political parties have assured you of their support because they believe that you try to solve every problem by means of dialogue, by respecting the rules of democracy. How could you help the Hungarians in Slovakia, who feel that the government coalition's measures endanger their culture, their press, and their education?

[Kovac] I would draw a distinction between what the politicians say and what the Hungarian minority feels about this. Much is said in politics. However, for all that, the situation of the Hungarian minority has not changed—neither actually nor legally. The situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is generally recognized to be good. It would be very bad if their situation were to deteriorate. It is necessary that the situation of the Hungarian minority—together with that of the Slovaks and other minorities—improve. In particular, the possibilities for disseminating culture and education must be expanded.

I understand that certain measures can be interpreted as amounting to deterioration, given the current situation, whether we are speaking about the financing of culture, periodicals, or education. It is necessary to specify exactly what has not—but could—come about, and the representatives of the minorities should alert us to this in time. I say that such measures should be preceded by consultations, and that the competent state and government bodies should conduct a dialogue, so that they do not implement something surprising or unexpected which later cannot be justified.

For this reason, I myself met with representatives of the cultural associations, who said that the state support has not yet been distributed, and hence the running of some associations is at risk. I stated my opinion—my wish—that the distribution of state support should be regulated by stable laws which cannot be changed from year to year on the basis of which government is in power. I believe that this is a question which must be sorted out properly, in a manner which contains the possibility of being a long-term and stable solution.

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[Batta] You also met with representatives of the Association of Hungarian Teachers in Slovakia. These problems were discussed, no doubt.

[Kovac] We conducted an open, sincere dialogue. They reported on issues which cause them concern—primarily the ministry draft intended at the time for discussion by the government's Nationality Council, and also the position regarding alternative education. After I studied this draft, I established that it indeed contains certain proposals which, if implemented, could be interpreted first as discrimination against the teachers of Hungarian nationality, and second as giving the Slovak teachers unjust advantages. We again agreed that such considerable intervention could be realized only on the basis and premise of this being voluntary.

There was also discussion of how the Hungarian teachers would practice civil disobedience. I do not believe in the use of such means, and I said so clearly. However it became clear to me, from the explanation they gave, that they are aware of the responsibility entailed in exercising civil disobedience. For this very reason, they wish to use this means only if it does not endanger the interests of Hungarian students and citizens; also, they wish to respect the law and certain ethical rules. It became apparent that they would take this measure only as a final resort.

[Batta] According to some Slovak politicians, the Hungarian political parties are irredentist. Do you notice steps or intentions which might suggest this?

[Kovac] Some politicians hold such views which reach the general public. This understandably causes concern for the Slovak public. It has not emerged in the form of official statements, in practical politics. However, I myself have seen such documents of a working nature. We might think there are what might be called ideas of this type behind the claims for territorial autonomy, and that these could be followed by other steps.

I consider it reassuring that people who think rationally prevail in Hungary. Extreme nationalistic ideas have been marginalized there too—or at least this is what (Hungarian President] Goncz assured me. Hungary makes us understand that we together want to become members of the Europe Union, and—given that we are applying for NATO membership—to develop a joint system of security policy.

All this affects politics in both Hungary and Slovakia. It is thanks to this that the chances for any revival of such nationalistic ideas of this type are on the decline. I doubt that anyone could give this as the main political trend.

[Batta] It is often said that the political parties are becoming isolated from one another in Slovakia, that they are unable to find a common voice and to conduct a dialogue.

[Kovac] My impression is that the Hungarian political parties are trying to hold a dialogue with the governing power and with forces both within and outside parliament. I do not believe that they of their own will have turned in on themselves. [passage omitted]

Meciar Discusses Ties to Ukraine, Hungary

LD1606210495 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 16 Jun 95

[Interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Miroslav Lukac—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Lukac] Prime Minister, you returned yesterday from an official visit to Ukraine. Do you view our relations with Ukraine as more important than relations with other neighbors?

[Meciar] [Passage omitted] Our cooperation with Ukraine has been deteriorating ever since 1993 and, in fact, it cannot get any worse. Slovakia wants to develop normal economic and trade relations with Ukraine. In order to achieve this, we need a new framework for agreements and contractual relations, which will reflect market conditions. Relations with Ukraine are different from our relations with some other neighbors, where we have already made substantial progress in our cooperation.

[Lukac] Some people have reservations, saying that Slovakia is under the influence of Russia. Is there a possibility that these reservations will extend to the claim that Slovakia is coming under the influence of the East?

[Meciar] These ideas are totally irresponsible. Slovakia and the Slovak Government have clearly declared their foreign political orientation and are not deviating from it. There is some surplus production. Half of Slovakia's production is currently sold in markets with convertible currencies. We are looking for more markets in order to provide jobs for people. We need to put to use idle companies that were using different markets in the past. I consider it very misleading and incorrect to draw any political conclusions from these efforts. [passage omitted]

[Lukac] There appear to be several unsettled matters between Slovakia and Ukraine—for instance, the regime at the border crossing, due to which international cargo transport is said to be avoiding Slovakia—or the plant in Krivoy Rog steel works. Is it reasonable to assume

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that after your visit to Ukraine, these and other problems will be resolved more readily?

[Meciar] We presented these problems as one of the important issues for our talks, although not as the most important. First of all, the regime at the border crossing in Vysne Nemecke needs to be organized so that trucks do not have to wait 48 or more hours to make the crossing. Sometimes the waiting time can be even several days without adequate facilities.

We proposed that the border crossing in Ubla be expanded so that it can work round the clock. Currently, it closes at 1900. We proposed the opening of a new border crossing in Matejovce. We also suggested speeding up the works which would facilitate combined transport, so that trains and trucks move faster. We supported modernization of the Chop-Cierna nad Tisou line [railway line crossing the Slovak-Ukrainian border] in order to increase the amount of cargo reloaded. [passage omitted]

In 2005, we plan to have a highway link through Vysne Nemecke so there has to be a highway on the Ukrainian side. When we are discussing the increase in transport capacity, this is a must. [passage omitted]

[Lukac] Another interesting development has taken place with our other neighbor, Hungary [ratification of the Basic Slovak-Hungarian Treaty]. You have already said that a general agreement on protection of ethnic minorities' rights will be ratified first, while the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty will be the second step. However, will the ratification by the Hungarian parliament have no effect on the Slovak course of action?

[Meciar] Our course of action is rigorously logical, politically appropriate, and legally correct. The Slovak-Hungarian Treaty refers to the general agreement on ethnic minorities' rights. Unless this agreement is ratified, the interpretation of the treaty is not based on a legal document. Therefore, we decided on a different course of action. First of all, we will establish the framework and then we will bring about the content of our agreement so that there is no doubt about our intentions.

There is a section in the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty saying that the treaty cannot contradict this framework agreement on ethnic minorities' rights. The course of action adopted by the Slovak side has been internationally accepted. Whatever doubts on whether it will be passed raised by certain Slovak political parties groundless.

Let us take a look at the situation. Let us assume that the Slovak National Party [SNS] will not vote for it. We need 76 votes to pass the treaty in parliament. We have 82 votes. Without the nine votes of the SNS, we—that is, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Association of Workers in Slovakia [ZRS], have 72 votes [as heard]. The Slovak Social Democratic Party [SDSS] has promised two votes, and some other deputies have also said they would vote for the treaty. I have no doubts that parliament will approve the treaty. If the SNS abstains, that leaves us with 141 votes, out of which we can be sure of 73 [as heard]. So there is nothing to worry about. Everything has its time. Everything will mature and everything will be managed. [passage omitted]

[Lukac] Another issue focused on by both the media and the public this week was the coupon privatization. The government has decided to issue bonds of the Slovak National Property Fund [FNM] instead of shares in the privatized companies, and has argued that this way will be fairer to most of the citizens. Similarly to the coupon privatization, which undoubtedly had its shortcomings, are there any limitations in issuing the bonds?

[Meciar] This problem has been discussed a lot when we considered all pros and cons. The last straw was the state of the funds and the way they had invested citizens' coupons. We have considered what has happened to the coupons. The coupons were practically devalued. They have turned 30,000 [Slovak korunas] into 5,600. Many invested their coupons, and today they have nothing. It is therefore necessary to seek a socially fairer and economically more effective solution of the problem.

In the Czech Republic, some economists criticize the fact that by means of coupon privatization, all property ended up in the hands of some 500 families. We want our country's assets to end up in the hands of substantially more families.

I listen to many political discussions and all I hear is political propaganda. I hear no economic assessment or analysis. That is missing. In my personal view, this model [of the coupon privatization] which is to be finalized on Tuesday in the government and will have to be approved by parliament, the supreme decisionmaking body in this respect, gives citizens the security that they are receiving 10,000 [Slovak korunas]. The citizens can be sure that this sum will earn interest and that inflation will not devalue it. They can also be sure that they decide where to invest it and how effectively the money will work for them. [passage omitted]

We do not want the second wave [of the coupon privatization], for which we are politically responsible, to end up like the first wave, which, by and large, was not very successful.

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Defends Privatization Model

AU1606153195 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 15 Jun 95 p 5

[TASR report: "Economic Results Arouse Admiration; Vladimir Meciar: Meeting Someone Who Will Not Inform Objectively Is a Waste of Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Speaking on Slovak Television's "Press Club" program on 13 June, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar assessed the situation that arose at the news conference held in the course of the Tuesday government session [when journalists of the most important dailies walked out in protest over the government's information policy] as a "small variety show." The prime minister was reacting to the demand of Lubomir Lintner, deputy chief editor of the daily SME, that either the prime minister or Deputy Prime Minister Sergej Kozlik come to the news conference to brief the press.

According to Vladimir Meciar, press secretaries will continue to provide information to anyone who wants to receive it. He said that the government discussed 35 different items and that "interrupting the meeting only because someone, about whom I am 100-percent sure that he will not report objectively, wants to talk to me is a waste of time for me and the other persons concerned." The prime minister believes that there is nothing new, "newspapers that were opposed [to the government] are still opposed, they staged another spectacle, the world will have something to talk about, but bread will not become any cheaper because of that."

No Property Sell-Off

Speaking about privatization, Vladimir Meciar said that the government has divided companies into those that will not be privatized at all and those in which the state will have a share, through which it will be able to protect the strategic interests of the Slovak Republic. He stressed that, in line with promises given to citizens, no sell-off of property is being organized. A legislative draft has been submitted regarding the organization of coupon privatization by means of bonds. It is about guarantees. The National Property Fund will guarantee the volume of bonds with all its property and all its commitments. The prime minister said that discussions continue regarding the registration of the bearer bonds and the circulation of these bonds' money. To prevent the bonds from being devalued, the conclusion was reached to pay annual interest equivalent to the discount rate.

Vladimir Meciar pointed out that the way has been cleared for the bonds to be used in privatizing apartments. The apartment buyer could pay the city, for example, with his bond. Each city could participate in privatization and have a share in the privatized property. The government has also dealt with the transfer of resources to various other funds. It is particularly concerned about the housing fund, for which the sum of 3 billion korunas [Sk] would be needed every year.

Solely in the Interest of the Citizen

The prime minister spoke about the government's endeavor to establish an environment that would motivate the citizen to put money into circulation and revive the capital market. He said that the government analyzed the negative elements of the first privatization wave because it does not want to repeat its mistakes in the second wave. It is solely and exclusively in the interest of the people that the government is looking for a different solution, Vladimir Meciar stressed.

The 5.8 percent growth of GDP in the first quarter of the year, the fact that inflation is under control, and other macroeconomic indicators achieved by the Slovak economy deservedly arouse foreign experts' admiration, Vladimir Meciar noted.

In connection with the material on economic policy in the years 1996-98 that the government discussed, the prime minister stressed that the main issue was to set tasks for individual government departments. These will then be incorporated into a document on the overall orientation of economic policy in the period in question. The program will serve as a basis for drafting the state budget for the pertinent years and the work of the Legislative Council and the government's activity will be adjusted to it.

Search for a New Partner

Minister of Economy Jan Ducky spoke on the "Press Club" about the completion of the Mochovce nuclear power plant. He said that the safety aspects have already been considered by experts at all levels and no longer represent the main problem. The main problem now is time because each month of delay causes losses. The most advantageous forms of financing are now being sought and talks with all interest groups will be held by the end of the month. "We want to find a partner who will not continue setting new conditions for us and, at the same time, we want Slovak firms, in particular, to participate in the project's completion," Jan Ducky said.

Speaking about the establishment of the Slovak Information Agency, which should go into operation as of 1 July 1995 and whose founder is the Slovak Government Office, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar stressed that the sum of Sk100 million is foreseen for its activity.

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Its chief activity will be to provide objective and comprehensive information about Slovakia to foreign countries. Vladimir Meciar welcomed the ratification of the basic treaty between Hungary and the Slovak Republic by the Hungarian Parliament. He stressed that the treaty placed a full stop behind the past and opened the door to future cooperation between the two countries.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 15 June on page 11 carries a 400-word CTK report on Prime Minister Meciar's appearance on the "Press Club." Meciar is quoted as having said that, at its meeting on 13 June, the government approved a 7.8 percent increase for all pensions. The bill is supposed to be discussed by parliament later this month and "could go into effect on 1 July." The increase will reportedly require Sk250 million a month, that is, Sk3 billion a year. According to Meciar, the government also plans to raise minimum subsistence as of 1 September. "These measures are possible only because Slovakia is doing well in its economic policy," Meciar is quoted as having said.]

Korean Deputy Minister Holds Cooperation Talks

LD1606212195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yi Chae-chun, special envoy of the president of the Republic of Korea and a deputy foreign minister, ended his two-day visit to Slovakia today. After his talks yesterday with Foreign Minister Jozef Schenk, he met today with Jozef Sestak, state secretary in the Foreign Ministry. Agata Stanekova has more details:

[Stanekova] After their joint talks yesterday, Juraj Schenk and Yi Chae-chun signed an intergovernmental agreement abolishing visa requirement for visits lasting up to 90 days. Juraj Schenk pointed out Slovakia's interest in the development of bilateral cooperation, especially in the economic sphere. Yi Chae-chun and Jozef Sestak briefed Slovak Radio and TASR on the results of the talks today. The special envoy of the Republic of Korea said he is extremely satisfied with the results of the talks. [passage omitted]

The Korean guest said:

[Begin Yi Chae-chun recording in English fading into Slovak translation] The Republic of Korea and the Slovak Republic share common values, namely political democracy and a market economy. In my view, in these two spheres we share a lot in common. We can further develop our cooperation in these spheres, especially in the economy, as there are still opportunities to complement one another. [end recording]

[Stanekova] The special envoy also praised the cooperation between Samsung and Calex [producer of refrigerators and freezers] and said he would like to encourage Korean companies to become active in Slovakia, either in joint ventures or through other business activities. State Secretary Jozef Sestak added:

[Begin Sestak recording] In our part of the talks, we handed over an official note of our Foreign Ministry, in which we expressed Slovakia's support for the Korean Republic's candidacy for the seat allocated in the UN Security Council to a group of Asian countries for 1996 and 1997. My counterpart highly appreciated this concrete demonstration of our support for the Republic of Korea. In return, we asked the Korean partner to support our candidacy for the post of UN General Assembly chairman in 1997, a post being seriously contested by Slovakia. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Stanekova] According to Jozef Sestak, Slovakia said it is interested in having Korea open an embassy in Bratislava. He also added there are opportunities for our two countries to cooperate in the organization of our airlines and in air traffic infrastructure.

Cabinet Approves Creation of Information Agency

AU1606134295 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 14 Jun 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Juraj Alner: "Government Also Discussed Coupon Privatization Yesterday"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—At its 25th meeting yesterday, the government discussed and approved the draft "Uniform State Protocol in the Slovak Republic," which replaces the hitherto "Principles of Diplomatic Protocol." The document concerns the president, the National Council of the Slovak Republic, and the government.

The government approved the "Comprehensive Draft of Measures and Institutional Provisions for Improving the Level of Information About the Slovak Republic Abroad." The document concerns the establishment of the Slovak Information Agency (probably as of 1 July), the task of which will be to integrate, coordinate, and provide publicly available information on Slovakia. The government approved from the State Budget the sum of 100 million korunas for agency activity. The agency will, first and foremost, provide information for foreign journalists.

The government approved the proposal, submitted by deputies P. Brnak, M. Ftacnik, and M. Secansky, to issue a National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Law on NRSR Rules of Procedure. The document sets

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the rules for meetings of the NRSR and its committees and regulates the legislative process in discussing draft laws and the organization of parliament's activity. [passage omitted]

Based on the results of elections in the Slovak Academy of Sciences [SAV], the government appointed Dr. Stefan Luby, candidate of sciences and an employee of the SAV Physical Institute, as SAV chairman. [passage omitted]

The agenda of the government meeting also included questions regarding the financing of the Mochovce nuclear power plant and the Gabcikovo, Zilina, and Tichy Potok water projects, the draft annual report of the National Property Fund [FNM] for 1994 and the FNM draft closing account for 1995 [year as published], and a report on the preparation of property to be offered within the second wave of coupon privatization. [passage omitted]

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 14 June on pages 1 and 2 carries a 500-word TASR report on the 13 June cabinet meeting, which includes the following passage: "The government acknowledged a report on the conditions of provision of resources for financing the completion of the Mochovce project and charged the government commissioner and minister of economy with negotiating, in cooperation with the deputy prime minister and minister of finance, with all potential creditors on the terms of the loan. The government agreed to make a commitment of a state guarantee for a foreign loan of $500 million for the Vodohospodarska Vystavba Bratislava state enterprise to secure the financing of the Gabcikovo and Zilina hydroelectric power projects and the Tichy Potok reservoir."]

Agency Structure, Mandate

AU1906120495 Bratislava SME in Slovak 15 Jun 95 pp 1-2

[Article by "rk": "The Slovak Republic Will Spend 100 Million Korunas by the End of This Year To Improve Level of Information About Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—As an agency for the presentation and promotion of Slovakia, the Slovak Information Agency (SIA) will integrate, coordinate, and provide information about Slovakia. The basic directions of its activity include the active promotion of the Slovak Republic's positive image and the systematic rectification of false information and signals about the Slovak Republic abroad. This is the basic mission of the newly, about to be established SIA, as formulated in the "Comprehensive Draft of Measures and Institutional Provisions for Improving the Level of Information About the Slovak Republic Abroad," which the Slovak Government approved at its meeting on Tuesday, 13 June. According to the approved document, the SIA is to go into operation on 1 July 1995 as a subsidized [prispevkova] organization operating under the Slovak Government Office. After 1 January 1996, the possibility will be considered of transforming the SIA into a shareholding company with majority state participation. The sum of 100 million korunas [Sk] will be appropriated from the State Budget for the SIA's activity until the end of 1995.

The largest items included in this sum are "orders for specific services placed with other agencies—Sk45 million" and "other expenditure (monitoring, car pool, etc.)—Sk43.585 million." Investment costs are to amount to Sk8 million and salaries for 30 employees from 1 July to 31 December 1995 to Sk2.415 million.

According to the approved draft organizational structure and activity of the SIA, the agency's main tasks are to monitor, collect, and analyze information on the Slovak Republic appearing in foreign media and publications; to respond to misinformation and positive information about the Slovak Republic in foreign media; to issue, distribute, and mediate information on the Slovak Republic; and to systematically work with foreign journalists, set up a Center for Foreign Journalists, and win public opinion leaders abroad.

In the initial phase, the SIS is to have four sections—an organizational department, a section for collecting, sorting, and documenting information, a section for the production of information materials, and a services section. There will be an Interdepartmental Council (made up of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy, and Culture, and the Slovak Government Office) and a Council of Experts ("personalities that can, by virtue of their experience and authority, contribute to the sending of good signals abroad"), which will operate as SIA consultative bodies.

New SDSS Platform Aims To Change Leadership

AU1906105595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 14 June on pages 1 and 3 carries a 700-word interview with Jaroslav Volf, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), by Martin Krno, entitled "Laluha's and Zala's Handwriting." In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Volf is asked to respond to the "new turmoil" in the SDSS, caused by the formation of a new SDSS "platform," the Social Democratic Revival. Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 15 June on page 2 carries an 800-word interview with Boris Zala, member of the SDSS Political Board, by Martin Krno entitled

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"Criticism of the Party of National Lukewarmness." In the interview, which was conducted in Bratislava on 14 June, Zala, who is one of the signatories of the new platform's statement, discusses the goals of the initiative.

SDSS Chairman Volf tells PRAVDA that he was "surprised" by the emergence of the new platform and its criticism of the party's insufficient activity because the all-Slovak SDSS conference, held in March 1995, had "expressed support for the party's further course of action as well as for our parliamentary policy," which implied support for the party leadership as well. Volf announces that the SDSS Presidium will deal with the new platform's views at a meeting on 17 June. Asked who is "behind" the initiative, Volf replies: "So far, the group has been presented to me as headed by Lubomir Kohut, the platform's coordinator. I know, however, that Messrs Laluha, Zala, and Hotar are also members of this platform. This is revealed by the vocabulary of the statement they drafted. But I do not want to go into details because I want all members of the Presidium and district officials to assume a stand on this issue. Only then shall we make a certain recapitulation."

In the interview, Volf also rejects the "Czechoslovakist label" that he was assigned by Stanislav Sikora, member of the SDSS Political Board, in a recent interview for the Bratislava daily SMENA. Volf says that he considers Sikora's attacks "unethical" and his arguments "devoid of rational foundations." The SDSS chairman insists that the party's policies "are clearly for the benefit of the Slovak Republic" and "for the benefit of the citizens of our republic, which we consider to be the basic national and state interests of Slovakia."

SDSS Political Board member Boris Zala tells PRAVDA about the goals of the platform: "It is the result of three years of struggle for the party's direction. Lubomir Kohut from Prievidza has become the coordinator of this activity. The rest of us are only the platform's signatories. We have been warning for years against the loss of left-wing values and stressing the need for the SDSS to orient itself toward various social strata, including workers. Our second motive are fears of Social Democracy's lack of roots in the Slovak milieu. It is as though the SDSS policy were one of abstract ideas mechanically transferred from the Socialist International. The third important reason is that, over the last two years, a great potential of competent people has been eliminated from the SDSS because the emerging plurality of views did not meet with the party chairman's understanding. His sole criterion was whether someone supported him or not."

Zala confirms that the new platform reproaches the current SDSS leadership for its "Czechoslovakism." According to Zala, this "Czechoslovakism" does not manifest itself in SDSS leaders' speeches but "in their national lukewarmness." Zala describes "Czechoslovakism" as "an old disease of Social Democracy" in Slovakia and deplores that "pro-Czech or Czechoslovakist" thinking prevails among a "substantial part, though not the majority, of SDSS members."

Zala also admits the new platform's ambition to bring about personnel changes in the SDSS leadership: "Our initiative is geared toward the SDSS congress in October. We want to offer its delegates an alternative. Naturally, such an alternative is also connected with inevitable leadership changes. We are not expelling anyone, however. This is not an act of revenge or a purge. We are only convinced that it is necessary to pool all resources and support, in particular, local and regional politicians. New blood must be infused into the leadership. I think that Volf will assert himself as a parliamentary politician. But he does not have the power to integrate and maintain in the party various currents of opinion."

In conclusion, Zala is asked why the new platform did not confine its activity to the internal party level, but went public with its criticism. Zala explains that the platform's initiators do not want to involve only SDSS members in the discussion: "We deliberately gave our platform the name Social Democratic Revival, and not SDSS Revival. We intend to set in motion a much broader process, aimed at renewing the spiritual atmosphere of the entire left in Slovakia."

First-Quarter Figures Show Economic Upturn

AU1606160395 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 15 Jun 95 p 3

[TASR report: "The National Economy Has Developed Favorably"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The favorable macroeconomic trends from last year have continued in the national economy's development in the first quarter of 1995. This ensues from a report released by the Slovak Statistical Office. The decline in generating assets has been slowing down since 1993. This process also continued in 1994 and was reflected in the suspension of the downward trend in generating the gross domestic product (GDP), whose year-to-year level in 1994 increased by 4.8 percent. In the first quarter of 1995, compared with the same period of 1994, GDP grew by 5.8 percent. Industry in particular played a part in this increase.

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Moderating the pace of inflation also underpinned the favorable results. The state budget deficit in 1993 and 1994 had had a relatively inflationary effect. In 1993, it amounted to 23 billion korunas [Sk] and accounted for 6.8 percent of GDP. Budget management in 1994 ended with almost the same deficit, Sk22.8 billion. However, its share in GDP fell by 1.1 points to 5.7 percent. At the end of the first quarter of 1995, the state budget deficit amounted to Sk4.1 billion and accounted for 3.8 percent of GDP. A substantial rise in the level of unemployment, by 4.0 points to 14.4 percent, took place in 1993. At the end of 1994, it was 14.8 percent and, at the end of the first quarter of 1995, it was 14.6 percent.

In the structure of household consumption, consumption of agricultural and food products increased in the majority of households. According to the statistics on family accounts, in the first quarter of 1995, the average per capita net monthly wage amounted to Sk3,230. This is an increase of 9.1 percent compared with the first quarter of 1994. Net per capita expenditures in the first quarter, compared with income, fell by Sk40 and amounted to Sk3,190. Of aggregate expenditure, 84 percent was accounted for by expenditure on goods and services. Compared with the first quarter of 1994, expenditure on foodstuffs increased by 10.8 percent, on nonfoodstuffs by 10.1 percent, and on services by 13.3 percent.

The average nominal monthly wage for an employee in the national economy (including an estimate for employees and tradesmen) during the first quarter of 1995 amounted to Sk6,389.

Material Shortages Hamper Recycling Efforts

95CH0264A Bratislava TREND in English 17 May 95 p 27A

[Summary by Carolina Smrstik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

Slovak Producers Face Shortage of Materials To Recycle

The paper industry has a shortage of 200,000 tons. South-Slovak Pulp and Paper Mills a.s. in Sturovo (Juhoslovenske celulozky a papierne, or JCP) processes 120,000 tons of waste paper per year. The shortage of waste paper first appeared in the second half of last year when even their permanent suppliers from abroad failed to fulfill their contracts. Import regulations keep the ratio of domestic and imported waste paper utilization at 50:50. The amount of Slovak waste paper eligible for JCP Sturovo is only some 50,000 tons a year. "We cannot import more. That's why we have to cut production," said Kazimir Szunyogh, specialist for trade in JCP Sturovo. Szunyogh proposed solving the problem by reorganizing the collection of waste paper in Slovakia.

Waste paper is 14.3 percent of the annual volume of municipal waste—weight, 231,000 tons. JCP produces cardboards and paperboards. The other major manufacturers of waste paper products in Slovakia are Harmanee Paper Mills a.s. in Harmanee and PT a.s. in Zilina, both of which produce sanitary paper. Small mills include Central Slovak Pulp and Paper Mills a.s., Ruzomberok (Stredoslovenske celulozky a papierne, or SCP), and Slavosovce Paper Mills s.p. in Slavosovce, which process paper similar to that by JCP Sturovo.

The pulp and paper industry in Slovakia requires almost 300,000 tons of waste paper of various kinds. After cellulose, waste paper is the second most important raw material. However, the actual annual total of waste paper in Slovakia is only about 100,000 tons. Paper consumption per capita is some 70 kg, while the return for recycling stated as a proportion of the collection of total consumption is about 39.7 percent.

In Austria, per capita paper consumption is 160 kg per year and its return is greater than 60 percent.

"Before, about half of the waste paper supplies for JCP Sturovo were coming from the Czech Republic. Now it reaches only 10 percent of total supplies," explains Szunyogh. This year the manufacturers need to import 177,000 tons of waste paper.

In Slovakia, the amount of collected waste paper is gradually increasing after an extensive decline. Collecting waste paper for purchase by recyclers has become interesting for citizens as well as for entrepreneurs. However, in 1989 there were about 130,000 tons of paper collected, while in 1993 there were only 89,000 tons. Waste Materials s.p. Bratislava (Zberne suroviny), the biggest supplier of waste paper, perceives the decrease in the purchase of waste paper as due to the insolvency of paper industry companies, mostly from more than two years ago. The manufacturers were unable to pay for delivered material within 30 days, which caused the shutdown of a few waste paper collecting businesses. When foreign firms paid to have their paper waste taken, Slovak firms preferred to import that paper rather than use domestic sources.

In scrap metal, there is a shortage of 300,000 tons. Podbrezova Iron Works a.s. (Podbrezovske zeleziarne, or PZ) and Eastern Slovak Iron Works Kosice (Vychodoslovenske zeleziarne, or VSZ) rank among the largest processors of metal scrap in the Slovak Republic. Last year the iron works consumed through production almost 200,000 tons of scrap. This year they recorded

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orders for processing about 300,000 tons of scrap. Products are exported to West European countries as well as to the Middle East and East Asian countries. Annually, both companies together with a few smaller ones, such as OFS Istebne, ZTS Dubnica and ZTS Martin, require 900,000 tons. Domestic sources offer just 600,000.

Thus the scrap must be imported. Considering the boom in the metallurgical industries all over the world and the increasing demand for this commodity, it is not a simple task. There has been a recent trend to increase the portion of scrap during production. Steel production in electric furnaces demands one-third less energy than production from the iron ore in the blast furnaces. Technological waste from the actual production in PZ Podbrezova—40,000 to 50,000 tons—is recycled and the rest must be purchased in the form of scrap.

Problems with the shortage of scrap in Slovakia probably arose when the monopoly of the only supplier, the state-owned Kovosrot, crumbled. Today Kovosrot controls only one-third of the Slovak market. The recent decrease of scrap production and demand for its products in Slovakia has been caused by the transformation of the economy which has not yet solved problems in engineering, usually the largest purchaser of steel goods. Also the former Comecon market, where Podbrezovske Zeleziarne used to export 60 percent of its production, disintegrated. PZ was not solvent to pay for deliveries of scrap in the terms agreed upon in these deals. New and experienced suppliers also started to turn toward foreign markets, where the market price per ton was higher.

The problem with obtaining scrap in Slovakia remained though manufacturers became able to pay for the deliveries in time. A major portion of processable scrap was exported, though according to Slovak legislation only unprocessable scrap may be exported. This suggests that inside the customs union there is no limit on the amount of scrap exported to the Czech Republic. There is only a slight difference between world and Czech prices. In Slovakia, one ton of scrap costs Sk2,800 ($93)—an increase of 60 percent since 1991. One ton can be exported abroad for $90-95. Zeleziarne Podbrezova used to sell for five times that value.

Scrap recovery has begun at old dumps estimated to contain 8 to 10 percent reusable materials. The PZ Podbrezova dump should be utilized in ten years and it is expected to yield some 50,000 tons of metallic scrap annually. The scrap shortage in Slovakia could be solved by controlling scrap export through Czech Republic, better inspections at customs houses, and by partially privatizing Kovosrot, according to the management of PZ Podbrezova. The most effective way to solve the shortage of scrap in Slovakia could be through correcting the definition of secondary materials and waste. If the scrap could be treated as a secondary material, problems with export and import would be eliminated.

Glass has a shortage of 60,000 tons. In Slovakia, waste glass is processed in Skloobal Nemsova as a substitute for primary glass material. This production has lower energy costs. The capacity of container glass production in Skloobal is 166,000 tons a year, which enables the processing of some 80,000 tons of glass slivers. Last year Skloobal obtained only 22,000 tons from domestic sources and it is estimated that the potential of domestic gathering is not more than 40,000 tons of slivers. Most of it comes from consumption. The annual municipal waste is 7.7 percent glass, or 125,000 tons. Skloobal purchases up to 80 percent of slivers from domestic sources from manufacturers of container glass, said Jiri Fajt, technical director of Skloobal. The determining supplier of glass slivers is Waste Materials s.p., but it is not able to supply a sufficient amount of slivers although potentially it could collect half of the needed material.

The manufacturing capacity of sliver glass in Slovakia is higher than the possible collection of it. In Slovakia 14-15 kg of container glass is used annually per capita, compared to 40 kg in Italy. Skloobal still exports part of its production and that also decreases the presence of the glass waste. Slivers must always then be imported. The import must be managed with the same principles relevant to other secondary materials. The imported amount will cover shortages when using the capacity of domestic sources of waste materials.

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Commentary Assesses Results of Horn's U.S. Visit

AU1606171795 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 15 Jun 95 p 11

[Commentary by L.G.J.: "The Measure of Success"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If we measure the success of Prime Minister Gyula Horn's U.S. visit with the number of salvoes of cannonfire in his honor, then this visit was indeed a flop. And why do people who are preparing to make it warm for the prime minister at home complain about the lack of friendly flames in the fireplace?

It might not be necessary to use a more serious form to prove that the success of Horn's eight-day U.S. visit cannot be measured with the formal framework of official protocol. Of course, if we take the actual agreements made during this week as a measure, we still could not mention many examples. Nevertheless, a certain amount of time has to pass before the true balance of the visit can be seen.

It will probably be different from the preceding expectations and more complex. Horn mentioned the possibility of a number of concrete results (for example, the opinion was expressed that at least a statement of intent can be achieved with the IMF on the standby-loan agreement), but domestic diplomatic circles received these with immediate reservations.

However, we should instead start from Hungary's international image, which has deteriorated much in recent months. Or, as it was put politely in the United States, the region's other countries have caught up with Hungary. This time, presenting the March economic package, Horn wanted to prove that we have regained our leading role in the area of reforms in eastern-central Europe. (A domestic political note: This is one of the reasons why it is understandable that the prime minister defended [Finance Minister] Lajos Bokros both in the United States and back home. He has to expect that the results of his U.S. trip would lose most of their value with a new finance minister because the government could then restart the bargaining—and under worse conditions—with the IMF and other international organizations).

It is difficult to find arguments to support the claim that the journey had not been properly prepared. Horn met the most prominent representatives of the current administration and its Republican opponents, not to mention the rather active propaganda and press activity. Visiting the editorial rooms of the most important U.S. newspapers and giving talks at the Washington International Press Club and, in addition to the capital city, at New York and Los Angeles foreign political forums, he was given good opportunities to again direct the attention of political opinion makers to Hungary in central Europe. The results of these cannot be measured in a short time because, in accordance with its practice, the U.S. press gave rather limited attention to the visit itself. However, it is likely that the content of articles written on our region will be influenced by the information that was given in closed circles.

Therefore, there is no point in questioning the need for such visits. In the case of a country like the United States (which, in addition to being the only surviving world power, is also the biggest investor in Hungary), highest-level public relations work is essential. The intensive Hungary-propaganda (primarily among business people) can prove to be profitable. However, it is especially true in this area—which will also draw the balance of the whole visit later—that success or failure will depend on whether the reforms and the promises to continue the privatizations will be implemented with as much consistency and domestic stability as was claimed in the United States.

Poll: 57 Percent Favor Goncz's Reelection

AU1906102495 Paris AFP in English 1004 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, June 19 (AFP)—Hungarian President Arpad Goncz is expected to be elected by parliament for another five-year term during the first round of elections here 19 June. Goncz, 73, needs a two-thirds majority of the 386 representatives in parliament to win the secret vote against opposition candidate Ferenc Madl, 64, a lawyer.

Goncz, originally a Free Democrat himself, suspended his membership when he became president in 1990. He enjoys the support of the 209-seat faction of Prime Minister Gyula Horn's governing Hungarian Socialist Party and that of its coalition partner, the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats, which holds 70 seats. The two parties enjoy a 73-percent majority in parliament and analysts say that it will only be a close fight if dissident members do not turn up to vote. No abstentions are allowed.

Madl, a former cultural minister in the previous governing coalition until May 1994, can expect around 80 votes from the three opposition parties which named him. They are the centre-right Hungarian Democratic Forum, which led the previous coalition and now has 9.6 percent of the seats in parliament, the Christian Democratic People's Party (5.7 percent) and the FIDESZ Civilian Party (5.18 percent).

To vote, representatives will cast their ballots in an urn placed in a corridor of the building closed to anyone

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except representatives when voting starts at 3.00 p.m. (1300 GMT). Goncz could be sworn in for his second term as soon as the votes have been counted, expected by 4.30 p.m. (1430 GMT) Monday, if he receives at least 258 votes. But if no winner is announced Monday, parliament will vote a second and possibly a third time on Tuesday and Wednesday, respectively. The candidates' names have to be submitted for Tuesday's potential second round where a two-thirds majority is also required, while no new submissions are needed for a potential third round which will be decided by simple majority.

A fourth opposition party, the right-wing Independent Smallholders' Party, which holds 26 parliamentary seats, has said that it will not take part in the vote after its motion to elect the president by direct referendum instead of parliament was rejected by the Constitutional Court in May.

But even if the elections were to be held by referendum instead of parliament, Goncz would emerge the winner with 57-percent support according to the results of a poll published by the MAGYAR HIRLAP daily newspaper on Monday.

The poll, carried out among 1,358 telephone subscribers chosen at random, showed that in case of a referendum Madl could expect 10-percent support, four percent would support a third, unnamed candidate while 29 percent had no opinion. The poll also showed that Goncz's main supporters belonged to the 30-45 age group and had some higher education, while the older generation tended to support Madl.

SZDSZ Chairman Peto Views Party Relations

AU1506102795 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 14 Jun 95 p 11

[Interview with SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto by Tibor Franka; place and date not given: "Ivan Peto on Cooperation Between the SZDSZ and the Socialists—A Cohabitation Relationship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Franka] A few days ago, in Szolnok, you said that you agreed with the Bokros package, although two weeks earlier you told another newspaper that its welfare policy section could only be seen as an emergency measure. Which Peto stance is the real one?

[Peto] Both of them, because the Bokros package is indispensable given the country's current economic and financial situation. Of course, many details are debatable, some sections could have been made better over a longer period, nevertheless, the whole package is acceptable as it is. It is true that the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] had also submitted amendment proposals on welfare issues and, in my view, better ones than those that were finally accepted by parliament, however, again, our starting point was that the framework of the package should not be changed. To return to your question, I feel that I was consistent in my statements.

[Franka] After the package, what are your views on its issuer, [Finance Minister] Lajos Bokros who, while taking money away from the country, has pocketed 16 million forints of severance pay?

[Peto] The question is of whether he was entitled to it. I assume that, on paper, he was. However, there is also another side to this issue, namely the moral side. A finance minister who justifiably introduces restrictive measures cannot accept this amount of severance pay.

[Franka] I have calculated that the total population of two medium size villages do not earn as much as this in a month.

[Peto] We do not yet know the exact situation, only the messages from the United States, however, my opinion is that he cannot keep this amount if he wants to be a good finance minister....

[Franka] Remaining with the ministers, after Bokros, SZDSZ-member Gabor Fodor [minister for education and culture] has received most criticism. In addition to this, apart from the Welfare Ministry, most money is being taken away from the Education Ministry. The welfare minister recently reacted to this by resigning. Has Fodor not considered something similar?

[Peto] The Bokros program is, in effect, the implementation of the government program with a nine-month delay. Those who remained in their positions certainly cannot be blamed for the fact that a minister did not remember this or was surprised at it. In other words, resignation is not a solution. Fodor's attitude is more consistent than this, but, I suppose, we cannot stop at this point. The effects of the general restrictions is something separate from the effects of the fact that the number of school-age children has decreased by about a third in recent years.... The latter has been ignored by the school system. Something also has to be done in connection with the fact that the middle schools have started to expand downwards and the number of grammar schools running six to eight year levels has been increasing. Today, it is more difficult to get into a grammar school at the age of 14 than into university with a graduation certificate.... It would also be good to do something—many people know this—with the untalented phony teachers and phony scientists who have remained at universities

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as old fossils. In the meantime, the money at our disposal is decreasing. Fodor has been initiating reforms and intends to implement them, partly because of the problems in the functioning of the whole school system and partly because of the budget changes. Naturally, this does not meet everyone's satisfaction.

[Franka] What relationship do you have with Gyula Horn, and what relationship does he have with the SZDSZ?

[Peto] Horn mainly has contact with the SZDSZ as prime minister. We, as party chairmen, have loose, but correct, relations.

[Franka] So the two governing parties do not wish to form a bloc?

[Peto] This idea could not even be raised because both parties want to maintain their sovereignty, especially since we are also in coalition with other parties in local governments. Nothing justifies closer ties between the two parties and the two chairmen.

[Franka] Your reply raises the question: How much harm is caused to the SZDSZ by the fact that the older deputies and the chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] were part of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP], and by the opinion that the SZDSZ was only needed to bring in foreign capital?

[Peto] If the SZDSZ was now in opposition, then the MSZP's contact system formed in the previous regime would probably be even stronger. However, let us start from even earlier: Through the fact that we had a peaceful change of the regime, and that the opposition parties sat down to the same table with the MSZMP for negotiations, it was actually declared that we do not consider the representatives of the one-party system as criminals. We can bring a moral judgment, but we cannot exclude them, and many things follow on from this. The margin by which the MSZP won last year also has its effects. Whatever I think of the previous regime, the Hungarian people—to use big words—decided that they wanted Horn. They knew who he was, what his past was, what he had done in 1956 and later, and they nevertheless accepted him. I, personally, might not be happy about this because a complete change would have been needed, however, I accept the situation even if I am not enthusiastic about it. As for the money: There must be some MSZP members who expect the capital from us, but the coalition was not set up on this basis. We were not given the task of bringing in the cash, and the MSZP was told to do something else—if someone believes in such things, then he is living in the world of fairy tales.

[Franka] However, many MSZP members believe that the past, the attitude, and the media power of SZDSZ politicians are harmful.

[Peto] As I have not heard or read in concrete terms what this means exactly, this sounds like an accusation to me. In my view, this might have started from that part of the press that support us more than the MSZP or other parties. [sentence as published] The SZDSZ does not rule the press, no one has ever proved anything like this.

[Franka] From our previous conversations, it is also clear that you consider it important to express the differences between the two parties. Are you in a marriage or a forced marriage with each other?

[Peto] I have never accepted this as a marriage; if I have to use a comparison, then I would rather say that our relationship is similar to that in a block of flats. People come to live under the same roof who do not have much in common, but who are forced by some practical reason to be next to each other. Common rules have to be established on who takes out the garbage, who sweeps the steps, who deals with joint issues, how much everyone pays, and all these have to be adhered to.

[Franka] What happens if someone does not adhere to them?

[Peto] Then they have a quarrel, shut the door on each other, and wait for the other to leave. Finally, one might even pack up and leave. Therefore, it is not primarily emotional links that hold the coalition together....

[Franka] The joint nomination of the president of the republic also seems to prove this, because, according to one of the opposition parties, Arpad Goncz cannot have a real contender because the MSZP and the SZDSZ dare not expose him to a national contest for practical reasons.

[Peto] This is only the opinion of one opposition party, but four parliamentary parties believe that the president should not be directly elected because, in this case, the president's parliamentary dependence would be slackened and his role would change, which in turn could also mean the weakening of Parliament and the prime minister. Besides, Goncz's election chances do not depend on whether parliament or the population elect the president, because, on the basis of the past five years, he would win in both cases.

[Franka] Is his popularity partly due to the fact that he does not have to bring daily political decisions and strict measures?

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[Peto] As, according to the current legal system, the president does not interfere in daily politics, he indeed does not have to give his support to unpopular measures. However, this is not the only reason for his popularity.

[Franka] Not disputing Goncz's suitability, one can nevertheless hear opinions that if the MSZP does not set an independent candidate, this proves the SZDSZ's leadership and the interest of a political clique.

[Peto] In such situations, all parties do not normally have a separate candidate, and there is nothing to say that the biggest government party has to insist on its own man by all means when it can reelect an existing president who is also appreciated by this party. In my view, the MSZP is acting very correctly when it nominates Goncz, because the party's majority support this.

[Franka] Three opposition parties have nominated a candidate. What are your views on the opposition's step and on Ferenc Madl, their candidate?

[Peto] It would not be appropriate to express my views on Madl in this situation because he is not our candidate. We often criticized him while he was [education] minister, and we know what he left for his successor. The actual question was whether the three opposition parties would be able to agree on a joint candidate, namely, if they are able to work together. In my view, Madl is a good choice from the opposition's point of view and, therefore, the common stance is understandable. However, it is unfortunate that they had announced in advance that they would not support Goncz, even if they had not chosen a joint candidate, because this weakens their commitment to Madl.

[Franka] This was the second time the SZDSZ reached second best place at the elections. My question is, why did it not come in in front of the MSZP, which finished behind it in 1990?

[Peto] A large number of the Hungarian electors had major changes of heart in their support for parties in the past five years. For example, according to surveys, those people, for example, who in 1990 voted for the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], which offered a more moderate change, swapped to the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP] when they became dissatisfied with the MDF, and they later became MSZP voters. Now, when the Horn government is introducing unpleasant measures, some of the voters sympathize with the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] because, although [Chairman] Jozsef Torgyan cannot be taken seriously, he at least gives the government a piece of his mind! At least one in three voters belongs to this mobile stratum. The SZDSZ is probably a type of party that cannot approach these voters very well and, therefore, the party managed to remain relatively stable while the MDF, the FIDESZ-MPP, and recently the MSZP also lost many voters from this stratum. I can only guess at what is in the future, however, it is a fact that, so far, the SZDSZ has had the most stable and predictable and least emotional voter base. Our members understand the restrictive measures and consider them necessary and, based on the SZDSZ's former statements, they were not surprised by them.

[Franka] I can sense some concern in what you are saying. If we were now facing the 1994 elections, what coalition would you definitely welcome?

[Peto] In the previous situation, we were serious about saying that it would be optimal for the two liberal parties, namely the SZDSZ and the FIDESZ, to be in the core of the coalition. Of course, the FIDESZ represented different views then.

[Franka] Who would have been the third party, because the two would have been a little too slim....?

[Peto] Since 1993, we have not excluded the possibility of coalition with the MSZP. The MDF and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] did much for the current setup when they were saying, increasingly loudly, that they would not enter into a coalition with the SZDSZ. As the elections were approaching, only completely uninformed people did not see that if the FIDESZ would not do it with the MSZP, the KDNP-MDF would not do it with the SZDSZ, and no one would do it with Torgyan, then what can be the result? We left this question open due to the known reasons.

[Franka] Then I need not ask which the third party would have been?

[Peto] You need not, we are past it now.

[Franka] However, we are facing a hot, possibly heated, summer.

[Peto] It is impossible to achieve economic stability and order without tensions, which means that I am expecting further tensions.

[Franka] Is it possible that the autumn will be even hotter than the summer?

[Peto] In a social sense, most certainly, however, there is no other choice.

Horn Defends High Wages to Businessmen, Bankers

LD1806180595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 18 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Prime Minister Gyula Horn, we have to become used to the idea that

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the most qualified business leaders receive outstanding financial rewards in a market economy. Referring to [Finance Minister] Lajos Bokros's severance pay of 16 million forints, the prime minister said at a June fete held in Nagyret that, in the lack of the contribution of well-paid experts, bankruptcies of banks can be expected and it will be far more costly for the country. Gyongyi Nemeth reports.

[Nemeth] According to Gyula Horn, bank leaders have to be well paid because the banking system will collapse without expertise, and the financial system's revitalization will cost far more than this—several tens of millions of forints.

[Begin Horn recording] Performance is decisive in a market economy. Performance in the banking and financial sector can be very precisely measured. This is why I do not agree with those who say that it is immoral for Bokros to accept the severance pay. Why is it immoral? If he received this money as a minister, I would also have to consider it, and even to take steps. [end recording]

[Nemeth] The prime minister considers the earliest possible privatization of banks important. Incidentally, parliament has recently amended the Labor Code. According to this, severance pay will be restricted to the minimum, although this will only apply to new contracts and not those that were concluded before the amendment to the law.

The prime minister objected to the critical tone of the opposition. According to Gyula Horn, the previous government has no moral ground for such attacks against the present government.

The majority of questions addressed to politicians were related to the Bokros package, with particular regard to family allowances.

World Bank Loan Contingent on IMF Agreement

LD1606212595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The World Bank is to grant a loan of some $1.3 billion for investments in Hungary. The decision on the loan, which is to be spread over the next four years, was taken by the board of governors of the World Bank yesterday when it adopted the Bank's Hungary strategy.

According to the Hungarian National Bank, the loans will help infrastructural and environmental protection programs and the transformation of the organizational structure of enterprises and financial institutions. The World Bank announced, however, that Hungary will be able to obtain $400 million of the $1.3 billion loan allocation only after reaching agreement with the IMF.

State Privatization Company Operational

LD1606210995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government has appointed the leaders of the State Privatization and Assets Management Joint-Stock Company that was formed today. Imre Szokai was named chairman of the board of directors. His deputy is Attila (Virag). The chairman of the Audit Committee is Sandor Puskas.

The company, which is operational as of today, has no managing director yet; Attila Lascsik, director-general of the former State Assets Agency, is only a candidate for the post. [passage omitted]

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Bildt Not Ready for Talks With Bosnian Serbs

LD1606222195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2156 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, June 16 (TANJUG)—New E.U. mediator for the former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt said here Friday [16 June] that he wished to contribute to a peaceful solution to the Bosnian conflict, but that at this point he was not ready to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs.

After a meeting with U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, which was also attended by U.N. mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg, Bildt told reporters that the Bosnian Serbs first had to accept the "Contact Group" plan as a basis for talks.

Bildt and Stoltenberg co-chair the international conference on the former Yugoslavia.

If the Bosnian Serbs soberly review the situation, they should be very interested in a political settlement, Bildt said and added that no one could score a military victory only to dictate political conditions to the other side.

Bildt said that the situation in Bosnia was deteriorating and that the international community was facing the danger of another escalation of fighting and violence.

Calling on Bosnian Serbs to stop trying to "stifle" Sarajevo, Bildt expressed understanding for the Muslim Sarajevo government's concern over the issue, but said he doubted that the Muslim offensive in Sarajevo would solve the problem.

Muslim forces on Thursday launched an offensive in Sarajevo. U.N troops on the ground described it as one of the biggest, most coordinated offensives of the 38-month-old Bosnian war.

Bildt said that he planned to meet Muslim officials next week, but not in Sarajevo, because going there was currently impossible. He said he would later confer with the other side, primarily Belgrade.

Bildt said he did not plan to go to the Bosnian Serb administrative centre of Pale.

Izetbegovic's Diplomatic Stand, Efforts Viewed U.S. Policy Criticized

LD1606203495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2004 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, June 16 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic on Friday sharply criticized the United States policy on this former Yugoslav republic.

In an interview to the daily DELO published in Ljubljana, the capital of another former Yugoslav republic Slovenia, Izetbegovic said Muslims 'have no reason to be pleased with the U.S. policy on Bosnia.'

'I believe the United States is too much under the influence of official London, which, certainly, is not good,' Izetbegovic said.

Izetbegovic also warned the United Nations that the Muslim leadership 'might soon deny hospitality (to U.N. Forces).'

'United Nations units cannot act against the interests of Bosnia- Herzegovina. If that happens, we shall certainly deny hospitality to them,' Izetbegovic said.

Since the beginning of the civil war of Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina more than three years ago, the strongest Muslim army offensive is currently under way on Serb positions around Sarajevo. The action was launched on June 14.

Army Actions 'Necessary'

LD1806173995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A few moments ago, we received a statement from the office of Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency. President Izetbegovic has received ambassadors Henri Jacolin [France] and Johannes Preisinger [Germany], who in the capacity of the so-called troika conveyed to President Izetbegovic the demand from the European Union on reducing military activities in the Sarajevo area.

Identical messages are to be delivered to the governments in Zagreb and Belgrade, and through Belgrade to the aggressor regime in Pale. [passage omitted]

President Izetbegovic told his guests that the actions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units in the Sarajevo area are necessary to alleviate the humanitarian situation and remove the military threat to the capital. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's actions have already produced results [words indistinct].

In this connection, President Izetbegovic presented conditions under which military activities at the approaches to Sarajevo may be halted. These are:

First, that the decision on the removal of artillery in the 20-km radius around Sarajevo in line with the NATO ultimatum issued on 9 February 1994, is urgently implemented.

Second, normalization of the humanitarian situation, which includes the reopening of the airport and land routes and normalization of the city's supplies of water, gas, and electric power.

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If this can be achieved by political means, we will refrain from further military activities, President Izetbegovic stressed, adding that we are also ready to accept an immediate cease-fire in the entire country and to enter peace negotiations on condition that Pale accepts the Contact Group plan, the statement says.

Silajdzic Calls For Lifting Arms Embargo

LD1806182795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has made the following statement for the press regarding the latest chetnik massacre in the capital:

This is yet another massacre in which seven of our citizens were killed and 14 wounded. These people were killed and wounded because they were looking for water. We will not ask foreign governments but the public and foreign parliaments to force their governments to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each government preventing us from fighting participates in these murders.

Our message to the foreign public and parliaments will be to demand that their governments lift the arms embargo.

On this occasion he expressed his grief and conveyed his condolences to the families of the Sarajevo civilians killed in today's [words indistinct].

Sacirbegovic Views Clinton Policy, RRF

AU1906075495 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jun 95 p 10

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic by Zdravka Soldic; place and date not given: "The Only Option for the Bosniaks Is Cooperation With Zagreb"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Muhamed Sacirbegovic, Bosnia-Herzegovina's new foreign minister and former ambassador to the United Nations, was born in Sarajevo 39 years ago. As a 11-year-old boy he moved with his parents to the United States. He has a doctorate in law and is married to an American.

Sacirbegovic is an occasional guest in the Croatian press and at the moment we are particularly interested in his opinion of the current events in the U.S. Congress regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as of the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] in Bosnia.

[Soldic] Mr. Sacirbegovic, the U.S. Congress has made a decision on the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. President Clinton has announced that he will veto Congress's decision. What outcome do you expect?

[Sacirbegovic] President Clinton may impose a veto, but the question is whether it will be successful. In Congress, the representatives have voted by three to one for the lifting of the embargo. Such a proportion, more than two thirds for the lifting of the embargo, is enough to overcome Clinton's veto. However, the problem is that, in addition to this issue, there are other unpopular issues to be resolved concerning U.S. interests abroad, whereas the relevant bill has not won a two-thirds majority. We shall soon see what will happen in the Senate. However, if Mr. Clinton is against the lifting of the embargo, then he must offer another solution. This solution cannot be that Europe should do whatever it thinks should be done, that is, what it has been doing so far. We have seen for ourselves that such a policy is unsuccessful and that it allows the Serbian aggressor to dictate the conditions for the resolution of the situation.

[Soldic] How do you view the deployment of the RRF?

[Sacirbegovic] It is still unclear what the function of this force is. This is primarily because the countries that took part in drafting the plan have not reached a consensus on the aim of these forces. This policy is still being worked out. We demand that the RRF fulfills the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate. If their deployment means that UNPROFOR will be more ready to fulfill its mandate, then these additional forces are a positive element. On the other hand, however, the forces may be deployed to secure UNPROFOR's withdrawal from some enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We consider that UNPROFOR must have an option for withdrawal, but at the same time we must have a chance to prepare ourselves for the possible consequences.

[Soldic] Are these forces coming to Bosnia without the Bosnian Government's approval?

[Sacirbegovic] We have spoken to them and told them that we would leave our definite answer for later, until the situation had become clearer. We have to know what their goal or mandate is, whether they will directly assist UNPROFOR, or whether they will just protect some reserve army. [as published] We demand that they cooperate with our government, particularly if they decide to withdraw.

[Soldic] Two days ago you were in London. Did you discuss with Douglas Hurd the function of the intervening force?

[Sacirbegovic] I talked to Mr. Hogg [minister of state at the British Foreign Office]. He told me that he expected the intervening force to help UNPROFOR to do its job, but he did not exclude the possibility of these forces'

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helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. They have several options and for that reason we must have our own options as well.

[Soldic] How do you explain that the RRF is principally made up of British and French soldiers? It is well known what those countries' policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina has been like so far.

[Sacirbegovic] We can be cynical and say that it is their way of dictating future politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some countries are not quite satisfied with such a decision, as they consider that the intervening force should help their troops on the ground as well as, for instance, the Pakistanis or Swedes. Who will help them to do their job? I think that, except for the Dutch, the troops of other countries will get involved in the intervening force as well. I hope that with the help of this force, which has only two commanders, the implementation of decisions on the ground will be accelerated.

[Soldic] In the context of all these events, might you demand that UNPROFOR's mandate be changed?

[Sacirbegovic] I think that we have a good reason to demand that its mandate be reinforced. However, at the moment one ought to take care that the existing mandate is fulfilled in the first place. Many resolutions favorable for us have been issued so far, but the bad thing is that nothing has been implemented on the ground. We from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Ministry are going from one foreign minister to another, but it seems that the real decisions are made at the level of defense ministers and their troops on the ground. What remains to us is to hope that the decisions made will eventually be implemented on the ground.

[Soldic] The Contact Group's ultimatum has not produced any result even after one year. Will you continue to insist on the acceptance of the plan or do you think that other territorial solutions are possible as well?

[Sacirbegovic] We support the plan of the Contact Group and we are continuing to cooperate with it, so we do not have any reason to demand a new plan. We believe that it is important for our policy to be consistent. I think that our forces are now strong enough on the ground, which makes a good negotiating position possible for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. Earlier we often had to accept some plans that were rather unfavorable for us, which the international mediators had designed mostly to suit the aggressor. The aggressor ought to know that we shall certainly not give up the Contact Group plan.

[Soldic] Several days ago, in negotiations with U.S. envoy Frasure, Milosevic again refused to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Do you think that the reason for his refusal is the price of recognition or that he has not yet given up Greater Serbia and is still cooperating with Karadzic? Do you expect Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina to happen?

[Sacirbegovic] Milosevic is just like Doctor Frankenstein and Karadzic is like Frankenstein's monster. In this situation, Milosevic has created a problem both for himself and for us. The question is to what extent he is able to control Karadzic now, just as Frankenstein was not able to control his monster at one stage. The question is: What is Milosevic offering now? It is possible that a double game is being played in all this and I think that the Croats and Bosniaks have been the victims of that double game. We are not satisfied with current relations between Milosevic and the Contact Group. I think that there is a tendency to reward Milosevic while getting little or even nothing from him in return. We believe that it is far better that mutual recognition between these three countries of former Yugoslavia takes place simultaneously, rather than separately, that is, that Bosnia-Herzegovina is recognized separately from Croatia. I think such an approach would eliminate possible allegations that two of the sides are working against the third. The Bosniaks have never had any other option save to cooperate with Croatia, which is the second victim of this war. We consider the mutual recognition of those countries to be a necessity, but we also think the recognition cannot happen at any price. I think that at the moment the price is much more important to Milosevic, so the Contact Group must know that time works to its advantage. If it cannot persuade him intellectually, there are still many more mechanisms left to be used.

[Soldic] Is Fraser an independent U.S. player or is he a representative of the Contact Group?

[Sacirbegovic] He works on behalf of the Contact Group, but he is also backed up by U.S. policy. I think that this is good for us, because we can influence U.S. policy. The United States supports Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as the victims in this war.

[Soldic] Can you raise the issue in the Security Council of the situation in northwestern Bosnia, that is, Banja Luka? Is there a possibility of a UN protectorate being imposed on Banja Luka, as was demanded by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government even before?

[Sacirbegovic] Over the last month we have sent five or six letters to the Security Council. We still have not received an adequate answer. It seems that the international community has forgotten about us and our citizens and that it pays attention only to its own policy and hostages, who are now in Serbian hands. I have quite clearly warned them that, while they focus on their

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hostages, Karadzic will demand a greater price to be paid for them.

[Box, p 10]

[Soldic] Who will take your place in the United Nations?

[Sacirbegovic] Ambassador Ivica Misic will continue to carry out his duties at our embassy and he will also manage the affairs of our mission to the United Nations.

[Soldic] Why did you accept the post of foreign minister? Do you fear that you might get killed, as Minister Ljubijankic was?

[Sacirbegovic] Fear is not the right word. Certainly there are worries, as always. I did not accept this post for material reasons or for any other reward. I am honored that I have been appointed to this post and that I have been entrusted with the responsibility for other people. I do not want to disappoint them. I shall be happy when peace is restored to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Ganic: West Applying 'Double Standards'

AU1606183895 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jun 95 p 12

[Interview with Ejup Ganic, a member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, by Alenko Zornija in Sarajevo; date not given: "Without Arms We Are Defenseless"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zornija] Mr. Ganic, what truth is there in the information on negotiations being held between the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] regarding the opening of a road that would lead in and out of Sarajevo?

[Ganic] It is more probable that those are rumors. In the talks with General Smith, it has been emphasized that since he already has the additional forces and necessary mandate empowering him to move around freely, there is no reason not to open a main road, particularly the one going via Ilidza and Hadzici. One of the major tasks of the new troops coming to Bosnia-Herzegovina is precisely to help out UNPROFOR with the distribution of humanitarian aid and to clear the routes by which the aid could be delivered normally. If he insisted on the road that goes via Mount Igman, however, we would not agree because one direction that Karadzic is keeping under his occupation would be lost, and we know what that means. That would certainly be a wrong approach. I told Gen. Smith that our police would be happy to regulate the traffic for large convoys that, for example, would bring firewood or coal into the city, but that road is not in a good enough condition for use by heavy vehicles. If he considers that the Igman road would be convenient for that, we shall not oppose his decision. Even now, certain UNPROFOR vehicles are using that route because the road via the airport is closed. But the assertion that the road held occupied by Karadzic's Serbs cannot be freed, that it cannot be used for UNPROFOR's needs, is definitely not true. One should do something to prevent UNPROFOR being put in unenviable situation whenever a relief convoy is on the road. The responsible people from UNPROFOR say frequently that they are not interested in waging the war for us, and I respond: "All right, we have not invited you for that reason—just distribute humanitarian aid to us."

[Zornija] What are UNPROFOR's further plans?

[Ganic] It is hard to get any information here in Sarajevo, so it seems that nothing has been settled yet. In my opinion, one of the major tasks of the reinforcements for UNPROFOR would be to go to Srebrenica and protect the people there. I do not have any doubt that the UNPROFOR forces in Srebrenica are facing a rather difficult time, but, on the other hand, UNPROFOR has got new forces that will make it possible for it to act. For UNPROFOR, there is no need to intervene in Zenica or in central Bosnia because there are no major problems there. In Sarajevo, we are short of supplies, so therefore we shall demand that international community do something about it. I cannot precisely tell you what quantities of supplies we still have in the city, but this is certainly the lowest level of humanitarian aid that we have had in the city in the past three years of war. If we had arms and ammunition, we would not be just sitting here. The problem is precisely that we do not have enough arms. But if the situation does not improve by the winter, I think that we will not be able to afford ourselves the luxury of freezing for yet another winter. The enemy uses precisely water, gas, and electricity as the major means of warfare. Now the weather conditions are more favorable, but just imagine how the situation will be like in the winter. At the moment, the humanitarian aid is insufficient to meet even the basic requirements of the people. It is necessary to deploy the additional military force. If UNPROFOR decides to combine the rapid reaction force with large convoys and to use major roads, the Serbs will set up checkpoints and additional obstacles that will make movement even more difficult, and in that case the additional force should clear the way for convoys.

Gen. Smith is trying in some way to reorganize UNPROFOR and to help the implementation of its mandate. On the other hand, there is a possibility that UNPROFOR is actually only regrouping, and that they want

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to disappear overnight with the help of the intervention force. Nobody wants to reveal their real plans to us. What we would like to see is efficient functioning on the part of UNPROFOR and the additional force. Perhaps they are doing this only for their own sake, to dodge a catastrophe. It is normal that I am quite concerned about that. The Serbs have killed 10,000 adults and 2,000 children in Sarajevo so far, but the international community did not call this terrorism. However, when Karadzic's Serbs take UNPROFOR soldiers, who are professional soldiers and should be prepared to face troubles, as hostages, then they call it terrorism. Now they are saying the Serbs are responsible, but when shells pound the very center of Sarajevo or Tuzla, they say Karadzic is not directly responsible. These are double standards that are not good for a unified approach in fighting terrorism. Because, if you apply such double standards, as is the case in Bosnia, that will discredit UN forces when they confront criminality elsewhere in the world, particularly in the countries where the interests of the great powers are much greater than those in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

MBO Urges Rejection of Contact Group Plan

AU1606152995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In light of the critical situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] of Bosnia-Herzegovina has issued the following public statement, which, among other things, says:

The UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] is behaving as if its task were to maintain the existing situation. With its assistance and active participation, the aggressor is changing the demographic structure in the areas of Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa and occupying the free parts of the territory.

The MBO does not recognize the existing situation on the ground and is convinced that it will never provide any basis for the talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina's fate. They also believe that the time has come for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government to reject the Contact Group peace plan because, in the opinion of the MBO, this plan is geared to divide Bosnia to the detriment of the Bosniak people. We are convinced that our army will meet the square accounts with the Chetnik gangs and hordes and believe that the world, by lifting the arms embargo, should create the conditions in which this army could establish a balance in arms.

Muslim Political Party, Serb Movement Meet

LD1706211495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting was held today between delegations of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Serb Civic Council, headed by SDA Vice Chairman Edhem Bicakcic and Mirko Pejanovic, vice president of the Serb Civic Council. Talks were conducted on the topical issue of improving relations between the SDA and the Serb Civic Council. It was said that Bosnia-Herzegovina was viable as a democratic state of all its citizens and nations.

The two sides emphasized the high degree of agreement on the issues of defense and the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the role of the Serb Civic Council as a movement rallying all democratically oriented Serbs, including those living in the areas under the control of the government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the refugees, and those on the temporarily occupied areas. The Serb Civic Council activities have shown that the movement is a significant and influential factor in Bosnia-Herzegovina's democratic development. Contacts that the Serb Civic Council is enjoying with democratic forces in Serbia and Montenegro were described as useful. It was said that these contacts should be maintained in support of the forces committed to peace and to the recognition of the states that had emerged in the region of former Yugoslavia.

Buha Favors Return to Owen-Stoltenberg Plan

AU1906094695 Pale JAVNOST in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 95 pp 7-9

[Interview with Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Serb Republic, by Kolja Besarovic; place and date not given: "The Same Standards for Everybody"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the delicate action of the liberation, that is the takeover of a part of the arrested UN soldiers by the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the leadership of the Serb Republic was represented by Aleksa Buha, the foreign minister. This was a direct, but not the only reason for an interview with the head of the diplomacy of the youngest Serbian state. In this interview, Mr. Buha presented his opinion about the current dramatic situation and about how to overcome it.

[Besarovic] You have directly participated in the materialization of the agreement on the liberation of a part of the arrested UN soldiers. Why has the Serb Republic leadership decided to take this step?

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[Buha] For several reasons. First of all, we wanted to let the international community know that we arrested the UN soldiers not because it was our whim to arrest them, but because we were forced to do so in order to defend ourselves. There was simply no other way to show the international community that it could not act any longer in the way it had acted before. In addition to that, we also wanted to let the international community know that, although not ready to continue, we were ready to start a new peace process. The stalemate is not a solution to anybody, it only causes new destruction and victims. Therefore it is high time for the international community to dissolve the Contact Group, which has not accomplished its task in over a year. We wanted to draw the attention of the international community to the fact that it was necessary to establish a new conference about Yugoslavia, which would, naturally, start from different positions.

[Besarovic] What do you mean in concrete terms?

[Buha] After a whole year, neither the status of the Contact Group, nor its relation toward the London Conference is clear. To be more precise, it is not clear whether the London conference about Yugoslavia is still alive, or whether the Contact Group has taken over its mandate. We have tried hard to clarify this relationship in our meetings with both the Contact Group members and the chairmen of the conference, but we could not move away from the beginning. The chairmen told us at the beginning that the Contact Group was their body, that it was a body—so to speak—that should make communications easier, but it has, unfortunately, broken communications. Apart from that, the Contact Group has gradually pushed the cochairmen into the background, in order to establish itself as the main negotiating party.

[Besarovic] The activity of the Contact Group is characterized by everything but impartial mediation....

[Buha] The Contact Group has made two cardinal mistakes. The first is that it has exceeded its mandate regarding the maps. We know that the only firm parameter it can have is in the percentage, but it is not clear to us how the percentage stated in the maps has been reached. The Contact Group has exceeded its mandate, because—instead of negotiating and respecting the territorial priorities of both sides—the then U.S. representative Redman simply drew demarcation lines during the first meeting with us. I would like to remind you that Redman later on boasted that all Muslim and Croatian interests were fulfilled by that proposal. In other words, this was an awful shame.

[Besarovic] What was the other cardinal mistake made by the Contact Group?

[Buha] It exceeded its mandate when the political status, that is, the elaboration of possible elements of a constitutional arrangement, were designed. Although the Contact Group was entitled by the foreign ministers of its member states to treat both sides equally, it did not do so in practice. When we asked them whether they had taken over the results of the "Washington papers," according to which the independent Muslim-Croatian federation was established, the Contact Group representatives gave us a positive answer. In these so-called working papers, the Federation really appeared as the Muslim-Croatian entity, but the mandate according to which both sides had to be treated equally in negotiations about the political arrangement and according to which a possible Union [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] should not be a creation imposed from outside but a result of negotiations between the two states—that should in the meantime have become independent—was not respected. If the Federation had been considered independent, the function of the so-called Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia should have been annulled by the creation of that Federation. If it had wanted to create a Union, the Contact Group should have started from different positions, since the situation was different, too. It should have brought the two states to the negotiating table, at which all of them should have discussed the relations between future states. Unfortunately, the Contact Group exceeded its mandate, and its biggest mistake is that it betrayed its name, too. Instead of making contact with the parties to the conflict and enabling them to negotiate, it made the Serbian side illegal. Contact with us was made only when we were given an ultimatum. All this speaks in favor of the necessity to establish a new conference that would start from different positions. Regarding the political arrangement, two or three independent states—this depends on the Croatian will—should be established, and if the international community wants to remain respectful, it should make a proposal for the establishment of a union according to the model of the European Union. Regarding a territorial partition, the starting positions should be changed, too. The same is true of territorial percentages, especially regarding the way in which these percentages are put together.

[Besarovic] Does this mean that the Serb Republic leadership still insists on getting more than 49 percent of the territory?

[Buha] It should be clear that we possess 63 percent of the territory, which does not mean that we have the same percentage of wealth. The percentage of the wealth distributed on this percentage of land is considerably smaller, so that if we want wealth and the Muslims' territory, an agreement is possible. We would give a certain percentage of the territory to the Muslims if

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they agree that we take a certain percentage of the wealth. If things develop like this, the previous political solution—which implies the creation of one or three new independent states—would release both sides of possible fears regarding possible injustice done to the party that has a smaller percentage. If we get rid of that danger, the criteria that will take into consideration the distribution of wealth and usefulness, in other words the potential of the states regarding communications and all other elements, will be something that will cast another light on the whole thing. In other words, I think that it is possible to find a just solution also for territorial partition. Both sides—I mean the Serb and the Croatian assemblies—have accepted the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, whereas the Muslims have done this only in principle. We could start from the percentages stated in the Owen-Stoltenberg plan.... [passage omitted]

[Besarovic] Regarding the negative experiences with verbal promises made so far by the so-called international community, what guarantees does the Serb Republic leadership insist on before freeing the arrested UN soldiers? Do you require written guarantees this time?

[Buha] There have been no written guarantees so far. There have been messages and attitudes mediated to us through secret channels. There is, apart from that, I would say, a certain logic in these things, or if you like, an internal logical that does not always necessarily have to be presented as this or that document. I hope that the world has already seen that the arresting of the soldiers was not an act of terrorism, but an existential reaction. [passage omitted]

[Besarovic] It is obvious that the conflict can be solved in two possible ways. The crisis can either become more tense, with a possible military intervention of the UN Protection Force and NATO, or a real political compromise will be found. Are you an optimist in this respect?

[Buha] The latest events have changed the situation and the status of the UN Protection Force. It has been announced that a rapid reaction force will come, although not even the authors of the proposal know what to do with it, beginning from its mandate to the scope of its tasks. According to some people, the establishment of this force is practically a step forward toward the pulling out of UN Protection Force from Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the rapid reaction force has to strengthen the UN Protection Force position and protect it from possible attacks, if "regrouping of 'old UN Blue Helmets'" is foreseen, it must be assumed that this is a kind of preparation for the evacuation of the UN Protection Force. If it comes to that, the conflict will certainly escalate and this would pave the way for a military solution. There is a possibility, however, of avoiding the military option if the Muslim side makes its proposals. I would personally recommend to all three sides to go back to the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, that is, to the maps of that plan, with certain corrections....

[Besarovic] As the most realistic solution of all peace plans made so far....

[Buha] Certainly. We have to return to it and each of our nations will have its own territory and its own state. After that, we shall see whether we shall make a union or not. If someone wants a union, he should create it, if someone wants to leave it, he should leave it.

Prospects Following Hostage Release Viewed

LD1806190295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1614 GMT 18 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 18 Jun (SRNA)—Dr. Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said at a news conference in Pale today that 26 UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] members were free and waiting for a coach to take them to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Those freed include 15 observers and 11 Canadian members of the Blue Helmets, Koljevic said, adding that four Serb soldiers, held by UNPROFOR since 27 May, were transferred to Lukavica barracks on the Serb side at 0200 this morning.

"We believe in the promise that there will be no more air strikes against the Serb republic," Koljevic added, saying that the "unfortunate episode" which has just ended might give a fresh impetus to the renewal of the peace process.

"I hope that the latest Muslim offensive on many fronts which is still under way will prove to the other side that it cannot count on victory and that the only way out lies in negotiations," the Serb republic vice president said.

However, should the Muslims decide in favor of a war option and fail to halt the aggression on the Serb republic, he warned there will be no more negotiations on percentages [of territory].

"If the Muslims want war we will fight to the end, but then there will be no talk of percentages. The world knows who has started this offensive and we have full legitimacy to respond to it with all means at our disposal," the Serb republic vice president said.

Thanking Jovica Stanisic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's special envoy, for his successful mediation mission, Koljevic said that "this is yet another sign

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of the Serb republic and Serbia coming closer on the path of searching for a fair and peaceful solution to the conflict in former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

"I am convinced that this rift between the Serbs will not last for much longer; we might have finally realized that the world community wishes to achieve its goals through our rift. This game is over," Koljevic concluded.

Addressing numerous local and foreign journalists, Serb Republic Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha expressed the hope that the NATO air strikes against the Serb republic will not be repeated and said that all the sides have got an adequate message from the latest developments.

The Serb republic foreign minister said that the international community should know that now is the opportunity for active participation of its mediators to renew political dialogue between the interested parties, "but on completely new bases."

"When the international community recognizes the Serb republic as an independent state, which has already been done in the case of the Croat-Muslim federation, and when negotiations on the maps are based on new criteria, peace will come by itself," Buha explained.

In a brief statement to the journalists, Jovica Stanisic, the special envoy of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, expressed satisfaction with the successful completion of his mediation mission and with the fact that relations between the Serb republic and the United Nations are becoming normal.

Krajisnik Assails UN Inaction Over Offensive

LD1806200995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1823 GMT 18 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 18 June (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb republic, said today said that "all responsibility for the dead and wounded on the Sarajevo battlefield and for the manipulation of media should be borne by the insane policy of the Muslim hawks headed by Ganic."

Commenting on the continuing aggression against Serb Sarajevo, the speaker of the Serb assembly told SRNA that "it is an unfortunate fact that the international community and the United Nations take a benevolent view of what is going on and that they are not reacting as they would if Serbs were to attack Muslims."

"We are asking ourselves, where are General Smith and Mr. Akashi now, why are they not threatening the Muslims with attacks now that it is they who have launched an offensive from a 'protected zone'? Or, perhaps, we have not been brought up to date. Perhaps the protected zones no longer exist," Mr. Krajisnik said.

"When this Muslim offensive is crushed, just like the previous ones, and when the Serbs, quite logically, launch a counteroffensive to liberate the largest concentration camp in this war—the Muslim part of Sarajevo—will the United Nations and international community threaten the Serbs and offer their impartial services," Krajisnik asked.

Replying to a statement by the new European Union mediator in the negotiations on the former Yugoslavia, Carl Bildt, who said that he was not going to contact Serb republic representatives in the course of his mission, the speaker of the Serb assembly said that in this situation no progress can be expected in the negotiations.

"We are disappointed, if it is true that Mr. Bildt is to continue the policy of the Contact Group who have wasted over 10 months as they were maintaining contacts with themselves or those who were not able to resolve the crisis," Krajisnik said.

"If Mr. Bildt pursues the same policy and thinks that he can solve the problem without the Serbs of the Serb republic, then we believe we have gained nothing by his arrival and that the step ahead in quality we hoped for has not taken place," the president of the People's Assembly of the Serb republic said in his statement for SRNA.

Serb Deputies View Benefits of Serb Unification

AU1706174395 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 15 Jun 95

[Report by Sanja Eric]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the second day of the Serb National Assembly session, deputies unanimously adopted a decision and constitutional law on the unification of the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina. After a show of hands, Serb Republic Assembly Momcilo Krajisnik said that the unification process should be realized as soon as possible.

[Krajisnik] Those commissions are entrusted with preparing all the necessary documentation in order to establish our future state as soon as possible.

[Eric] Gaso Mijanovic, member of the joint commission, informed deputies about its activities and pointed out that the Croats and the Muslims seceded in order to deprive the Serb nation of its status of a constituent nation and that, through the act of unification, the Serb nation exercises its right to self-determination.

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[Mijanovic] The Serbs from Krajina and the Serb Republic have a right, like all other nations, to establish their own state, to decide about their political status, and to secure their economic, social, cultural development, as granted by the UN Charter and as determined in the constitutions of the two republics.

[Eric] Speaking about the unification of the two countries, Mr. Mijanovic talked about possible negative consequences as well as the benefits of the unification of the Serb west of the Drina River. [passage omitted]

Furthermore, it was pointed out that the unification would do away with the Vance-Owen plan and the Contact Group plan and force international factors to organize a new peace conference. In that case, the unified Serb state would be a more respectable factor in peace talks.

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Army Threatens Operations Against Serb Krajina

LD1606150795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1409 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 16 (TANJUG)—Croatian Army Chief of General Staff Gen. Janko Bobetko on Friday threatened with more Croatian war operations against Serb Krajina, saying Croatia 'can choose the time and place' for seizing 'every inch of Croatian territory.' [Words indistinct] Gen. Bobetko said, Croatia should do this wisely lest an erroneous policy should turn the world against Croatia's interests.

Croatian army has so far launched five aggressions on the Republic of Serb Krajina, set up by Serbs in Croatia in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and attempted to downgrade the constituent Serb people to a national minority.

According to Serb Krajina sources, Croatian troops in their May 1 aggression on the Western Slavonija region in the U.N.-protected Serb Krajina alone killed more than 1,000 Serb civilians, took 1,700 civilians and soldiers to prison camps and forced more than 15,000 others to flee the region.

Former Croatian defense minister retired gen. Martin Spegelj told a panel discussion of the Croatian Independent Democrats party in Zagreb late Thursday that Croatian army should go on supporting Bosnian Muslims on all battlefronts.

Spegelj said Croatian army should send small but professional units to all operations.

Well-informed Spegelj thus confirmed Croatia's direct involvement in the Bosnian war, which Zagreb is trying to deny despite irrefutable figures.

Defense Council Denies Rift in Leadership

LD1606180295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Defense and Security Council today held a session under the chairmanship of President Franjo Tudjman. The session reviewed topical issues of relevance to international relations and the foreign political position of the Republic of Croatia, the current domestic policy situation, and important economic issues.

Speaking about Croatia's international position, the president of the Republic stressed that it has been significantly improved by the liberation of Western Slavonia, the marking of the fifth anniversary of Croatia's statehood, Croatia's joining the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary], and the commencement of official negotiations on an agreement on trade and cooperation with the European Union. Croatia has been unequivocally accepted as a full-fledged political partner which has managed to build a stable political and economic system in spite of political and economic hardships.

The Croatian president warned that certain intellectual and political circles are still trying to force the Republic of Croatia into accepting the idea of resolving the crisis in southeastern Europe within the framework of some sort of Balkan, Yugoslav, or Adriatic union or confederation. The Croatian state authorities are certainly in favor of resolving disputes peaceably and normalizing relations on the basis of the mutual recognition of all of former Yugoslavia's successor states, but any kind of solution in the context of the aforementioned unions or confederations are out of the question. In this respect, the session of the National Defense and Security Council underlined its unanimous support for the Croatian authorities' foreign and domestic policy.

The National Defense and Security Council voiced full support for the government of the Republic of Croatia in the continuation of the implementation of its economic policies, the basic objectives of which are a balanced budget, the stability of the national currency, and a low inflation rate. The Council concluded at the end of the session that all speculation about a rift in the state leadership is unfounded.

Poll on Administration's Record in Croatia

95BA0265A Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 95 p 13

[Unattributed article: "What Citizens Think About the Authorities' Work Over the Past Five Years, the Opposition, Democracy, and Emerging From the Crisis: Expectations Met"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian polity has a vision for emerging from the crisis, democracy in Croatia is developing in the right direction, the authorities have more or less met the citizens' expectations over the past five years—these are the summarized results of an opinion poll conducted by OBZOR on 22 and 23 May using 450 respondents from all of Croatia's zupanijas.

When asked "Have the Croatian authorities met your expectations over the past five years?" around half of the respondents (48.7 percent) responded "partially," 30.7 percent responded that their expectations have been met entirely, while 20.7 percent said that they have not been met.

We also asked the respondents to judge the work of the ruling and opposition parties over the period of the past five years. The ruling party received good marks

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from 33.8 percent, with 21.6 percent giving a good evaluation to the opposition parties; the work of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] has been so-so according to 52 percent, while 50.4 percent said that about the opposition parties; 12.7 percent of the respondents considered the work of the HDZ poor, while 21.1 percent held that opinion about the opposition.

Article Views Equipment of Armored Forces

AU1106203995 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 19 May 95 pp 18-19

[Article by Mario Galic: "Croatian Tanks in Western Slavonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Much of the credit for the success in Operation Bljesak [flash], the aim of which was to liberate western Slavonia, goes to the Croatian armored forces. Since the Serb rebels in Croatia had not had too many chances of seeing Croatian armored vehicles in earlier conflicts, the mere appearance of a large number of tanks was enough to make them run. When the rebel Serbs did take up the fight, the ultimate result was disaster for them. Croatian forces therefore destroyed six and captured six more Serb tanks during the operation in western Slavonia, losing only one tank in the process. Since the same types of tanks were used on both sides, the success can be ascribed only to the Croatian armored forces having much better tactics for employing armored forces, and a much higher level of training.

The best tank that the Croatian armored forces have is the M-84-A, which is serially produced in Brod. Each month between five and 10 of these tanks come out of the "Djuro Djakovic" factory, and many of their characteristics make them equal to the most contemporary tanks in the world. The main characteristics of the tank are its firepower, mobility, and armored protection. The basis of the firepower of the Croatian M-84-A tank is the 125-mm smooth-barrel gun, constructed especially for antiarmor combat. However, what makes this tank one of the best in the world is not the power of the gun itself, but the great potentials of the fire-control system (SUV), which consists of a laser rangefinder, a device for day/night surveillance and aiming, a ballistic computer, and a meteorological sensor. It is only the combination of the large-caliber gun with an automatic loader and state-of-the-art electronic aiming equipment that provides the M-84-A with the possibility to destroy enemy tanks at a distance between 200 and 4,000 meters with the first shell, not giving the enemy crew the least chance to return fire.

Mobility and Maneuverability

Thanks to the passive night surveillance devices, the crew of any M-84-A can see the enemy at a distance as great as 1,200 meters. Another good characteristic of this tank is its great mobility, which is provided by a 1,200-horsepower engine. The combination of the weight of 42,000 kg and a very powerful engine gives the tank a maximum speed of a little more than 70 km per hour, and a great mobility and maneuverability [prohodnost], since most of the bridges in Croatia can withstand a load of 42 metric tons. The relatively low weight also makes it possible for the tank to move on soft ground and makes transport on roads and railroads easier. The negative consequence of the low weight is relatively weak armor protection. The thickness of the armor on the front of the tank is satisfactory, but the sides and the back are relatively thin. This drawback is especially felt in fighting within small towns or villages, where the enemy can reach the tank from behind. In order to prevent that, the Croatian Army employs the tactics of synchronized progress of armored forces and infantry, in which the tanks provide fire support to the infantry, while the infantry protects the tanks from enemy flank attacks. Operation Bljesak has shown just how successful this tactic is. Other weapons that the M-84-A carries are a 7.62-mm machine gun, placed next to the gun barrel and a 12.7-mm heavy machine gun on the tank turret, the main purpose of which is to perform tank antiaircraft activity. This tank's ammunition load consists of 42 shells for the gun (22 in the automatic loader), 300 rounds for the 12.7-mm machine gun, and 2,000 rounds for the 7.62-mm machine gun. With modern aiming electronics and as great a tank firepower as 125 mm, as well as great mobility, the M-84-A successfully compensates for its relative lack of armor protection.

The most numerous armored weapon that the Croatian Army possesses is the T-55 tank, many characteristics of which have made it obsolete for a long time. Since the Croatian Army acquired equipment mostly through confiscating it from the former "Yugoslav People's Army," and the T-55 was the most common tank in that army, which was obsolete in more than one aspect, our armored forces acquired many such tanks. The production of the T-54, T-55's elder twin brother, started as early as 1947. This tank was a revolutionary achievement in many ways, and certainly the best in the world at the time. Its quality was confirmed in many wars during the 1950's and 1960's. The former Soviet Union produced over 50,000 T-54's and T-55's, and the overall world production of this tank has surpassed the figure of 75,000. However, after its 50 years' existence, the T-55 no longer meets the criteria for a modern

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tank. Its armor is too thin for all the modern antiarmor equipment, and its mobility (its maximum speed is 50 km/h) is no longer sufficient. The best part of the T-55 is still its 100-mm gun. With this gun all the T-55 tanks can target enemy positions up to 14,600 meters, and if they are brought to the mountains, such as Mount Dinara, the gun's range becomes several times greater. In additin to the 100-mm gun with 43 shells, these tanks also carry a 7.62-mm mounted [spregnuta] machine gun with 3,500 rounds, and a 12.7-mm antiaircraft machine gun on the turret with 500 roounds. Since T-55 tanks are the basis of the armored forces of the rebel Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there are still very many of them in the Serbian Army, they will also come in handy for the Croatian Army. The better training level of the Croatian crews and a higher combat morale will be crucial for victory each time our T-55's face the Serb ones.

Tank Fighters

Apart from tanks, Croatian armored forces also have infantry combat vehicles (BVP) M-80-A, designed to carry seven soldiers on the front, as well as for combat activity. The most efficient weapon on this armored tracked vehicle is the antiarmor guided missile Maljutka [Sagger], which is sent from a double launcher positioned at the transporter's turret. With the missile, the M-80-A can become a very efficient tank fighter. Other equipment includes a 20-mm rapid-fire gun (with 1,400 rounds), and a 7.62-mm mounted [spregnuta] machine gun (with 2,000 rounds). The best characteristic of this BVP is its navigational capacity, which makes it highly suitable for assault operations. Apart from the BVP's, the Croatian Army uses M-60 armored personnel carriers. They are designed exclusively for infantry transport, and are only armed with a 12.7-mm heavy machine gun.

Another thing the Croatian Army has "inherited" is a large number of armored combat vehicles (BOV). These vehicles were produced in Slovenia's TAM factory in three different variants. The BOV-M is designed for quick transport of infantry (up to eight soldiers), and is armed with a 12.7-mm heavy machine gun. The BOV-1 is equipped with two triple launchers of antiarmor guided missiles Maljutka (six missiles in all, and a large number of spares within the vehicle), the maximum range of which is 3,000 meters. The BOV-1 uses a modernized variant of this missile with semiautomatic guidance system. The third variant of this vehicle is called BOV-3 and is equipped with a three-barrel gun. The main task of this piece is antiaircraft defense, though it may well be used for accurately aiming at ground targets. With its low weight (5,700 kg) and powerful engine (148 horsepower), as well as the fact that it has wheels rather than a track, the BOV family can achieve a maximum speed of 95 km per hour and travel a distance of 800 km without refueling. Since Croatia has many roads, the maneuverability of the BOV's is only a little lower than that of tracked vehicles.

With the arms embargo, Croatia was forced to start its own production of a wide variety of weapons. One of its products is the LOV-12V armored vehicle, which is produced in Rijeka's Torpedo factory. Little is known about this vehicle, though a certain number of these vehicles belonging to the First Guards Corps participated in Operation Bljesak. Since it is mounted on the same truck [podvoz] as the BOV family, their main characteristics are certainly similar. Its maximum weight is about 8,000 kg, and maximum speed between 90 and 100 km per hour. So far, only vehicles armed with a heavy 12.7-mm machine gun have been seen, though there are certainly LOV-12's equipped with Fagot and/or Milan guided antiarmor missiles, which the Croatian Army also has.

Using its own experiences as well as the experiences from the wars that have been waged since 1945 up to the present day, the Croatian Army has elaborated its concept of employing the armored forces. The fact that in all the major operations so far the losses of tanks and other armored vehicles have been minor has proven that the adopted concept is the correct one.

[Box, p 18]

M-84-A

Crew: 3

Combat weight: 42 metric tons

Engine: 12-cylinder, 1,200 horsepower

Maximum speed: 72 km per hour

Weapons: one 125-mm gun, one 7.62-mm machine gun, one 12.7-mm machine gun

[Box, p 18]

T-55

Crew: 4

Combat weight: 36 Metric tons

Engine: 12-cylinder, 580 horsepower

Maximum speed: 50 km per hour

Weapons: one 100-mm gun, one 7.62 machine gun, one 12.7-mm machine gun

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[Box, p 18]

M-80-A

Crew: 3 + 7

Combat weight: 14 metric tons

Engine: 10-cylinder, 315 horsepower

Maximum speed: 64 km per hour on road, 7.8 km per hour on water

Weapons: one 20-mm gun, one 7.62-mm machine gun, double Maljutka missile launcher

[Box, p 19]

M-60

Crew: 3 + 10

Combat weight: 11 metric tons

Engine: 6-cylinder, 140 horsepower

Maximum speed: 45 km per hour

Weapons: one 12.7-mm machine gun

[Box, p 19]

BOV

Crew: 2 + 8

Combat weight: 5.7 metric tons

Engine: 6-cylinder; 148 horsepower

Maximum speed: 95 km per hour

Weapons: BOV-M—one 12.7-mm machine gun; BOV-1—launcher for six Maljutka missiles and one 7.62-mm machine gun; BOV-3—one three-barrel 20-mm gun

Serb Krajina Military Leaders Contrasted

95BA0265B Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 22 May 95 p 15

[Article by Milan Jelovac: "Serbian Terrorists: Successor Worse Than Predecessor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Mile Mrksic is a man who enjoys a special level of trust with the top military brass in Belgrade. This middle-aged officer, born in Banija, earned his general's stars upon the entry of the elite Belgrade 1st Guard Brigade of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in Vukovar.*

When the stocky Serbian general Milan Celeketic ordered the shelling of downtown Zagreb on 2 May, he thought that the worst was already over for him, because on that May Day he had lost two loves: Western Slavonia and his new, official BMW. At that moment, when he launched Knin's "reprisal strategy," he probably had no idea that he would be replaced only 15 days later.

Accusations are flying in Knin, where they are still squabbling over the question of "who is to blame for the military debacle and the biggest Serbian defeat in the former Yugoslavia," and apparently Celeketic was "advised" to resign on his own. The general, known for having been a guardsman and escort for Broz while he was alive but also a chetnik extra in the film "Uzicka Republic," prefaced his resignation from the post of commander in chief of the rebel Croatian Serbs with harsh accusations against the military leadership of Serbia and Karadzic's pseudostate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Yugo officer whose tanks entered Okucani in 1991 accused them of not sending the aid that they had promised, directly acknowledging that it was he who ordered the missile attacks on Zagreb.

General From Vukovar

"The absence of the expected and agreed-upon political and military aid from outside the krajina, as well as the dirty political games of individuals, caused the tragic results in Western Slavonia," Celeketic alleged, adding that he "no longer has the moral strength to go among the people and declare something that does not correspond to the truth." Celeketic's resignation was then accepted by Milan Martic; all of this should have also received the blessing of the "supreme defense council," but that is considered nothing more than a mere formality.

General Mile Mrksic, who is completely unknown to the public at large, was appointed to replace Celeketic. Nevertheless, information from his military biography shows that he is a man who enjoys a special level of trust with the top military brass in Belgrade. This middle-aged officer, born in Banija, earned his general's stars upon the entry of the elite Belgrade 1st Guard Brigade of the former JNA, under his command, in Vukovar. Skipping over some ranks, Mile Mrksic moved directly from lieutenant colonel to general. He then left the "liberators of Vukovar," as the Serbian media called this armored-mechanized brigade, his former colleagues, and the notorious KOS [Yugoslav Counterintelligence Service] general Veselin Sljivancanin, a man who enjoys the special trust of General Kadijevic.

After leaving Vukovar, Mrksic moved to Nis, where he served as commander of the special units. He then moved to Belgrade, where he became adjunct to the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, Lieutenant General Momcilo Perisic, a man who during the first artillery devastation of Mostar in the spring

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of 1992 "earned" the nickname "Napoleon from Kifino Selo."

It was straight from this influential post that Mile Mrksic came to Croatia, to Knin, which has now become the epicenter of internal Serbian disunity.

Mutual accusations by local political power holders are raining down from all directions, and the "Krajina" media are not even trying to hide them. There are two dominant blocs: Mikelic's and Martic's. Following Mikelic's open letter to the Serbian parliament, in which he bitterly accused Martic and Celeketic of "tub-thumping in Western Slavonia and closing the highway, which led to the campaign by the Croatian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the HV [Croatian Armed Forces]," and also accused the "patriotic part of the opposition, Seselj, Dindic, and Kostunica, of warmongering," a Knin labor union close to Mikelic also spoke out. It demanded from Martic an explanation of his actions before and after the events in Western Slavonia, asking him about rallies that he held "in that area on the eve of 1 May, with which he provoked retaliation." The Knin municipal union has also asked Martic uncomfortable questions about "the economic agreement with Croatia, the fate of refugees, and responsibility and the rendering of accounts to the people."

Putsch in Knin

Martic then responded: "Western Slavonia fell because the armed forces were not technically prepared, because of Mikelic, who did not provide money for that purpose, but rather spent it on dubious dealings...."

According to unconfirmed information that arrived just before the press deadline for this issue of HRVATSKI OBZOR, a putsch has taken place in Knin, with the self-proclaimed prime minister, Borislav Mikelic, being deposed. According to UNCRO [United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] information, the Serbian rebels are not withdrawing from the separation zones. Specifically, more than 2,000 armed Serbian rebels are still in the separation zones in the Knin, Glina, and Osijek sectors.

Whatever the case, the latest changes in the military leadership of the rebel Croatian Serbs indicate a reorganization of the already highly demoralized armed forces.

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Crvenkovski Views Current, Future Tasks

AU1706201795 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Jun 95 p 2

[Interview with Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski by Gordana Risteska; place and date not given: "The Impossible Situation Wastes the Public Patience"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Whether we like it or not, there are speculations among the public in every country. The domestic public, which is not immune to speculation, when speaking about the foreign policy of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], speculates on its alleged "Eastern phase": On the approach to direct Macedonian-Greek dialogue, on Russia's "coolness" toward our country because there are no official contacts at a high level, on "warm-cold" waves in the relations between the United States and Macedonia, on party "markets" and the great interest in ambassadorial positions.... In his interview for NOVA MAKEDONIJA, Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski gives answers to these dilemmas and reveals the real position of our diplomacy. At least the current position....

[Risteska] First of all, your East Asia trip gives the impression that there is something new in Macedonian diplomacy, that there is an attempt to "abandon" the constant engagement in the Greek-Macedonian dispute, because of which the public has often believed that all the other Foreign Ministry engagements were marginalized.

[Crvenkovski] Our engagement in solving the problems with Greece has been small so far. Public interest was primarily directed toward this dispute, but we did not want to make a mistake that others have made—of letting one dispute block our entire foreign policy. We tried to find possibilities for other engagements as well. Among the practical activity of the Foreign Ministry there is only one small part that is dedicated to the dispute with Greece, while other communications are of greater importance. The two recent official visits represented an important step forward in the establishment of contacts with a very important continent—Asia, with which we had very few contacts. This was the first high-level official visit of the Republic of Macedonia to China and Japan, which are countries of extreme importance in policy and economy. It is not necessary to mention Japan's economic power and role on the world's market. China is also experiencing great economic development that we read about a lot, but it is really rapid development when you have the occasion of seeing it on the spot. These two countries are extremely important partners for us. On the other hand, China is also a permanent member of the Security Council, where many key decisions about us are made, and it is very important for us to inform them directly about the real situation here, as well as about our views. Japan is also a member of the Security Council at present, and it will probably become a permanent member of this body soon. Bearing all this in mind, it is true that both countries are of great influence and importance for us. This was an occasion for establishing close links and communications with them.

[Risteska] When I said that our diplomacy is trying to "abandon" the Greek-Macedonian dispute, I did not mean that there is a tendency toward a passivity regarding this problem. On the contrary. The last meeting that you and President Gligorov had with Vance and Nimetz left the impression, not only thanks to Greek official and unofficial sources, that a Macedonian-Greek diplomatic "close encounter" is approaching. Is a direct dialogue in sight?

[Crvenkovski] There is nothing concrete that I can say on this subject at the moment. The old obstacles are still present, and the conditions have not yet matured so as to give rise to belief that results can be accomplished soon. However, it is encouraging that there is a growing awareness in both countries—and not just within the political structures, but at large—that it is vital to regulate mutual relations because both sides are losing a lot in this impossible situation. Nevertheless, it is a fact that there are some basic matters on which we cannot make concessions. Second, we cannot accept any unequal dialogue. A solution can only be reached if there is respect between the two partners and if relations are on an equal footing.

[Risteska] You stated recently that secret diplomacy has not been used for starting a direct dialogue between Skopje and Athens. On that occasion, you specified that there have not been such contacts on an "interstate level." Did you then have in mind that some people, on a different level, for instance General Grilakis [name as transliterated], are trying to help?

[Crvenkovski] I mentioned the interstate level because I am informed on this level. I know that there are interparty contacts, and this is not a secret; there are visits in both directions, there are contacts among nongovernmental organizations. I cannot make any statement on this part, because it is not my duty to be informed about such contacts.

[Risteska] Did the Foreign Ministry react, and if it did not, will it react to the strong Greek official and media accusations, that Macedonia is allegedly "the Colombia in the Balkans," that it is a "dangerous" manufacturer and seller of opium?

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[Crvenkovski] We can enter explanations and discussions on accusations that have a concrete background and that need to be explained. However, it is a nonsense to discuss matters of science fiction.

[Risteska] Nevertheless, Athens's accusations against Macedonia have been going on for too long, and all means are being used.

[Crvenkovski] It has been demonstrated in the past that all fabricated accusations against a state are counterproductive and mainly affect the country that makes them. I think it is wiser to let them experience the effect themselves, instead of entering into metaphysical arguments.

[Risteska] What do you think of Mr. Nimetz's "private stay" in Greece, regardless of who is covering the expenses. In principle, can a diplomat who is involved in mediation between two countries in a dispute afford the luxury of a "private stay" in one of these countries without counterproductive consequences?

[Crvenkovski] I do not see why any diplomat should not spend his vacations in any country he pleases.

[Risteska] You and the Macedonian diplomacy were reprimanded for exaggerated carefulness, but it was a surprise when you explicitly accused the Bosnian Serbs in Rome, although you did not explicitly react to the fact that Macedonia is not on the list of countries that Milosevic is asked to recognize in exchange for the lifting of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

[Crvenkovski] These are two separate questions.

First, it was not an accusation against the Bosnian Serbs, but in principle, normal international relations cannot tolerate taking peacekeepers as hostages. It puts the function of the United Nations and the whole international system at risk. The peacekeeping forces are present everywhere with the task of helping in the establishment and maintenance of peace, and if they are exposed to military actions, detentions, it can have heavy repercussions for the whole international order. We cannot, therefore, fail to react.

As far as the relations with the Contact Group on negotiations about the Bosnian crisis and the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro are concerned, there are many oscillations regarding the recognition of the republics. Sometimes mutual recognition of all the republics is mentioned, at other times all of them are named separately, but lately only Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are mentioned. We have clearly stated to all our partners in international relations that we consider it to be a mistake and that a rapid mutual recognition of all the states that were formed from the former Yugoslavia is indispensable for the stability of the whole region. It is a subject that we discuss during contacts with all diplomats, and this topic was also a subject of discussion during the visits to China and Japan, where we clearly stated our views. On that occasion, our counterparts demonstrated great understanding for us.

We cannot neglect the report of Badinter's commission in which it is stated that all the states that were formed from the former Yugoslavia are its equal successors. It is a key position without concessions.

[Risteska] Next week, the head of the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] mission, will be replaced by Mr. Sokalsky. Is the country not forced to explain the principles of its internal and foreign policy over and over again to all the new, and frequently replaced, heads of the UN peacekeeping mission in Macedonia? If this is true, but also for other reasons (let us recall the report of the UN secretary general), is it possible that, so to say, Butrus-Ghali is losing his fondness for Macedonia?

[Crvenkovski] In this case, it is something very positive for Macedonia. It is not a matter of the change of the head of the mission, but of the whole status of the mission. Mr. Hugo Ansson, who has played a very important role in the Republic of Macedonia, and who has proven to be well informed about the situation in our country, was Yasushi Akashi's envoy, which means that he was associated with the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] center in Zagreb. After the division of the missions, it was decided to send a special envoy of Secretary General Butrus-Ghali to Macedonia, which means that he would be under the direct auspices of the secretary general. This means that Mr. Sokalsky is not replacing the head of the mission, but the mission is gaining a new higher-level status. At the same time, it reflects our request that, first of all, the UN mission in Macedonia is different from the other missions in the region, and second, that Macedonia is in no way linked with the wars on the territories of former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the results of this mission are completely different.

[Risteska] You came back from Tokyo with a donation of $5 million as support for the country's balance of payments. After this visit, as well as on other occasions, you announced credits "under more favorable conditions." Macedonia's access to international financial institutions and financial departments of some countries has, so far, been a confirmation of its credibility and international status. Can requests for credit justify the fears about entering a phase in which debts will be too big?

[Crvenkovski] First of all, I think that it is necessary to view the problems of foreign debts, the ways of repaying them, and then to evaluate the final results. What was

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a big problem in the past—too many debts—came as a result of the fact that credits were taken for unprofitable investments. At this moment, we are not taking any such credits, and I do not see anybody who is interested in giving us such credits.

Second, the Japanese assistance that you mentioned is not a credit but a donation. Moreover, most of the credits that we are taking now are related to the development of the infrastructure, which means investment in the future development of the country. The credits are dedicated to roads and railroad networks, which has been justified by the Feasibility Study and there are not any dilemmas regarding this. On the other hand, these credits are taken under very favorable conditions, with an interest rate of 1 percent, with long repayment terms, with a grace period, which means that, in the end, they will practically be a gift.

[Risteska] Which point have we reached in the Agreement on cooperation with the European Union?

[Crvenkovski] As in all the other communications with the European Union, there is the question of the veto of one country that is a member of the Union. There can be no formal discussions on signing the Agreement before the Commission gives a mandate, and consensus is needed for such a decision.

[Risteska] Is bilateral cooperation with the United States showing progress, although the opening of the U.S. Embassy in Skopje has been postponed?

The opening of the U.S. Embassy in Macedonia is a formal question that is certainly of great importance, but the level of bilateral relations is very high and therefore we cannot have any complaints. We have already accomplished a number of subjects of economic cooperation with the United States. This country has given us a substantial economic assistance and the level of trade is rising, although not as much as we would like it to. However, it is first of all a matter of willingness of the companies for their inclusion on the U.S. market.

[Risteska] Such an intensity in the bilateral relations with Russia has not been marked.

[Crvenkovski] There has been a drop in the economic exchange with the whole Eastern Europe in the last few years, normally due to the great changes and transformations that are taking place there and in our country. Nevertheless, in the last few months, the companies have started picking up the pace and we hope that the previous level of exchange will be reached soon. Russia, as well as a number of countries of the former Soviet Union, like Ukraine, have always been our important economic partners and that is why it is very important to reestablish economic relations with them as soon as possible.

On the political and diplomatic levels, we have regular contacts, and our cooperation is outstanding in the international institutions. At this moment, we are scheduling some official visits that I believe will be soon accomplished.

[Risteska] Is there anything that you would like to add, something super exclusive?

[Crvenkovski] There is nothing super exclusive. However, the main preoccupation of the Macedonian Foreign Ministry in the next months will be as follows: First, membership of the Council of Europe, and second, membership of the World Trading Organization. We hope to accomplish these two tasks by the end of the year. Second, we will be engaged in signing bilateral agreements with countries with which we have established diplomatic relations. We will have to established legal regulations for the relations. This is really a matter of too many acts, a heavy job to do, it is a matter of hundreds of agreements that will have to be renewed or continued. Third, we will have to accomplish our admission to international conventions, and that is also an enormous job.

[Box, p 2]

Competition for Ambassadors

[Risteska] The public is always curious to know about questions regarding the staff in the Macedonian diplomacy. What point have you reached in the filling of vacancies in diplomatic and consular offices?

[Crvenkovski] So far, we have opened 20 diplomatic and consular offices, that is embassies and missions in international organizations, and this is very close to the point that we consider to be the best for a country of the size and type as is Macedonia in its international communications. Perhaps we might open three to four other embassies in countries with which we have not yet established diplomatic relations, like Australia, Canada, and some of the neighborly countries, and this would be the maximum number. Most of the countries will be either covered by permanent embassies or ambassadors located in Skopje. By doing this, the costs will be lower and the needs covered. We intend to develop a net of honorary consuls as well. The previous experiences of this were very positive and they will always be citizens of those countries.

At this moment we have not yet appointed ambassadors to some embassies, but I hope that we shall be able to make the selection soon.

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[Risteska] Does it mean that this will occur after interparty "bargaining"?

[Crvenkovski] That is a good question. This is not a matter of interparty "bargaining." In the past, I read many articles in our mass media about great pressure from the parties, about great interest in ambassadorial positions. I can tell you, with full responsibility, that the basic problem about the appointment of ambassadors was that we did not have enough candidates, least of all from the parties. I can tell you that I have asked the parties to put forward candidates a lot of times.

[Risteska] Can we take this as an opened competition?

[Crvenkovski] It is not seemingly an opened competition, but a fact. This does not mean that there are not many people who are interested in ambassadorial positions. However, this is a completely different matter.

Controversy Over Islamic Faculty at Kondovo

95BA0214C Skopje PULS in Macedonian 24 Mar 95 pp 20-27

[Article by Sinisa Stankovitj: "Faith and Mistrust"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Is the "deal" about opening a department in Kondovo, reached between the government and the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, a good way of avoiding foreign influences on Muslim believers?*

In one of his very first interviews, ever since he was elected president of the Mesihat of the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Hadzi Sulejman Efendi Redzepi (at that time, still a member of the Islamic Religious Community of Yugoslavia) emphasized the need for opening an Islamic theological department or Islamic science department in Macedonia, in order to ensure the "domestic" development of cadres for religious services. This was the official presentation of an idea that had been shared by the Islamic clergy and officials of the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia for some ten years but that assumed priority over the past three. The initial contacts between the representatives of the IVZ [Islamic Religious Community] in Macedonia and the Macedonian authorities concerning this issue started in 1992, when meetings were held between Dr. Blaze Ristovski, the deputy prime minister (of Mr. Kljusev's cabinet) and when, according to the leaders of the IVZ of Macedonia, they were promised that a department will be opened. Or, more precisely, that they will be given a final answer within ten days. Because of the fate of the Kljusev government, this did not take place (The fact that the government did not have a unanimous opinion on the issue of an Islamic theological department is confirmed by the talks and correspondence with the respective ministry, headed by Mr. Letavcov, was offered to the IVZ of Macedonia, as the initiator of the opening of an Islamic theological department, for example, to have a similar department as part of an already existing religious entity).

Thus, the (non)opening of the department remained dependent on the agreement between the representatives of the IVZ and the next two coalition governments. According to Djuner Ismail, the minister-spokesman, in the course of the discussions between the representatives of the IVZ and Risto Ivanov, who was then chairman of the Commission for Relations With Religious Communities, virtually all ministries were asked to voice their opinion on this issue. Their positive response, based on the fact that the newly opened department, as a specialized higher school, will remain outside the educational system of the state (like the theological department, the Islamic theological department will not be part of the two existing universities in Skopje and Bitola, the explanation being that Macedonia is a laic state), made possible the implementation of this idea.

Thus, the Islamic Theological Department will be built near the secondary theological school and the religious schools in Kondovo, in the vicinity of Skopje (which has been in operation for ten years). The department will include an amphitheater and classrooms, a student house, a place for ceremonies, a first aid facility, a physical culture premise, and a printing press.

However, ever since 27 February, in the presence of representatives of the IVZ of Macedonia, believers, and representatives of the Albanian political parties PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], NDP [National Democratic Party], ADS-LP [Albanian Democratic Union-Liberal Party], and the Turkish DPT [Democratic Party of Turks] and the Minister of Culture Estref Aliu (according to some news reports held in a very pompous atmosphere, which reminded of the situation in our recent past) the cornerstone was laid for the new Islamic Sciences Department which, according to the initiators from the IVZ of Macedonia, would be an independent Islamic Theological Department, with its own curriculum that will include religious and lay subjects and a professorial cadre from the ranks of the IVZ of Macedonia. The reactions of part of the Macedonian population were very sharp.

On the one hand, because of the time coincidence with the tragic Tetovo events (when the angered "stillborn" tore the cobwebs of self-pity and the lying to the public by the "first policeman," Mr. Frckovski, and the extreme worsening on the international level cost a human life!) and the efforts to open the so-called Alba-

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nian university, one of the reactions was that the department in Kondovo will mark the implementation of the Tetovo university idea of a rear entrance. At a time when the Macedonian Muslims were objecting to the activities of some mosque administrations in terms of collecting financial funds for the "Tetovo university," while the tragedy of the Tetovo events was still too fresh, even the arguments that laying the cornerstone was interpreted as a Ramadan celebration, could not be accepted. The pomposity and haste are not clear, particularly since we knew that the construction would not start immediately, that no construction company had been named, and that the financial structure was as yet to be developed. As to the fear of Islamic fundamentalism and its spreading in our country, it took little for them to explode in a variety of ways of national-religious imprisonment and phobias. In its communication, the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] proclaimed the laying of the cornerstone as the implementation of the parauniversity in Tetovo and accused the Macedonian government of bypassing the creation of a Balkan Islamic center in Macedonia.

On the other hand, the weekly DELO qualified the government's resolution on determining the site for the complex of the Islamic Theological Department a manipulation "carried out by the government in order to legalize its resolution that could be qualified as first-rate joke, not to say a naive forgery." According to that statement, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski signed the resolution on 27 February, when the laying of the cornerstone had already taken place and the official gazette in its issue No. 11 of 7 March of this year published the resolution No. 233-599/1 dated 15 February! These queries and, particularly, the question raised about the future size of the complex of the Islamic Theological Department, forced the government to answer and to notify the excited public as to what could be accomplished the fastest and the best before undertaking the building of the project. First, if it is not too late, in order to avoid our already traditionally late reaction and, second, because Macedonia needs urgently to put an end, once and for all, to the politicizing of religious, educational, and economic problems....

Zenun Berisa, the secretary of the Islamic Religious Community, stressing the readiness of the IVZ of Macedonia to organize the work of the department (a sufficient number of experienced cadres with academic titles who could teach the specialized subjects, the instructional program for a four-year curriculum of the intern type, which is in the stage of preparation, and the interest of young believers to undertake such studies, for every year the religious schools graduate some 40 members of the clergy who find jobs or pursue their studies abroad...), immediately rejected all accusations of Islamic fundamentalism and support of the Tetovo events along with the celebration in Kondovo.

"It is not a question of any kind of Islamic fundamentalism. No donations from abroad have been received, for we have neither accepted in the IVZ such donations nor will accept any assistance from abroad. We have not set any kind of conditions! The department will be built with the funds of believers and voluntary contributions and to the extent to which the citizens of Macedonia professing Islam want such a department, it is they who will contribute funds for it. The only objective of the department which, based on the receipt of funds, will take two or more years to be completed, is to ensure a trained cadre to meet our needs. Since there is a theological department of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, there is no reason for anyone to doubt that the opening of the Islamic Theological Department is something negative. At the moment we have some 70 of our compatriots studying in Islamic departments abroad, such as Egypt or Tunisia. However, pursuing studies domestically will eliminate the possibility of influences which develop different views and habits. The Islamic department in Kondovo has no connection whatsoever with the events in Tetovo! All of our documents were ready one year ago. The initiators of the Tetovo 'university' also had the idea of opening a theological department as part of the 'university.' However, the IVZ in Macedonia sharply reacted against it. There is no need to have any fear of any eventual politicization of the department, as well as fear of Albanization of the IVZ of Macedonia. The department will be attended by Muslim believers, citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, whatever their ethnic origin, Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, and Gypsies... as is already happening in the religious schools, and the instruction will be provided in Macedonian! Normally, inasmuch as necessary, the professors, who speak several languages, will be able to provide explanations in both Turkish and Albanian. Science is science. Islam does not select or separate languages. What is important is to learn."

"As to the organized part of the IVZ of Macedonia, the danger of the spreading of some kind of Islamic fundamentalism has not existed nor will exist. To the best of our knowledge, Muslim believers are not inclined to have a dual loyalty. Any direct or indirect foreign efforts to break up the IVZ of Macedonia would lead to bad consequences."

Remains to be seen to what extent will the agreement reached between the Macedonian government and the IVZ of Macedonia on opening an Islamic Theological Department avoid further politicization of religious

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issues. If (is that part of the "deal"?) the resolution of the department to accept no more than 25 to 30 students annually, strictly citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, will reduce foreign influence and manipulations with the religious feelings of Macedonian Muslims remains a very open question. Another unanswered question is who other than the leadership of the IVZ of Macedonia will keep track of the curriculum (bearing in mind that the department will not be part of the educational system of the Republic of Macedonia) and what will be the role of the Ministry of Education and Communications relative to the IVZ and the department? Although it is clear that the purpose of opening an Islamic Theological Department is the training of cadres for religious services (diplomas will be issued to the believers), mistrust of the faculty will remain by a high percentage of the non-Muslim population. In order for the fear to disappear that the cornerstone in Kondovo will mark the erection of yet another interconfessional barrier in Macedonia, unfortunately, will require a great deal of time and effort.

Registration of World Islamic Organization

95BA0214D Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 21 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by S. Colakovski: "Unregistered Humanitarians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Following the negative answer of the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to the request of the World Islamic Organization for Humanitarian Aid to be registered in our country, there have been speculations to the effect that IGASE helps only Islamic believers and strives to disseminate Islam in this area. "We provide humanitarian aid regardless of faith or nationality, for to us a person is a person!," says Mohamed Iktail, director of the Skopje office of IGASE.*

In the past few months, particularly since the beginning of the year, several foreign humanitarian organizations, almost all of them apparently headquartered in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which operated in our country, have triggered controversies among the public of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. All of this was precisely related to their activities in the Republic of Macedonia, which, as became clear, were not exclusively aimed at humanitarian purposes. The MVR issued an opinion about two of them, the El Haramein and Islamic Wakoof organizations, by the end of January: The police found in their official and private premises, in addition to small amounts of humanitarian aid, an extensive volume of religious publications, more than 100 Korans, and textbooks for religious instruction, blank and forged travel papers, seals, and receipts from foreign and domestic companies.... For that reason, El Haramein and Islamic Wakoof were forbidden to operate, while some 17 of their activists, citizens of nine different countries in Asia and Africa, were expelled from Macedonia. Additionally, it was unofficially said that these two allegedly humanitarian organizations had undertaken at one point to organize religious instruction among refugees, in the radical-fundamentalist line, and that the broadest conspiracy had been organized along with the recruitment of men aged 16 or older, who were later sent to the Bosnian front. According to some sources, prior to prohibiting the operations of the El Haramein and Islamic Wakoof missions in Macedonia, the "humanitarians" had been able to recruit almost 1,000 refugees who were sent back to Bosnia to defend Islam.

Approximately at that time a problem arose involving yet another humanitarian organization headquartered in Jedda, Saudi Arabia. Until April 1993 it operated in Macedonia. This applies to IGASE [World Islamic Organization for Humanitarian Aid], to whose request for the registration of their office in Skopje the MVR answered in the negative, explaining that that association does not meet the stipulations of Article 23 of the Law on Social Organizations and Citizens Associations (according to that law "the operations of an organization or association, should they be used to violate the Constitution and the constitutional order in the Republic of Macedonia, threaten the independence of the country, and violate fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution, threaten the peace and equality and promote religious and national intolerance and harm public morality will be prohibited"). In this context one could hear speculations to the effect that IGASE gives its greatest assistance to people of the Islamic faith and is promoting the spreading of Islam in the country.

What of it, the people at the Skopje IGASE office say. This is an organization which has registered its offices in 90 countries and has moved the center for the countries within former Yugoslavia, with 10 offices, to Vienna. "To begin with, I can say most responsibly that humanitarian aid consisting of food, means of hygiene, clothing, drugs and medical instruments, blankets, and many other things, we distribute regardless of faith and nationality! There are no differences to us, for a person is a person!" said Mohamed Iktail, director of the IGASE office in Skopje.

"Furthermore, ever since we arrived in Macedonia, we have not assisted any political parties or associations. We work with refugees, with the poor, with people who need humanitarian aid. We have no interest other than the humanitarian one! That is the way we would like to continue to work. All of our activities in Macedonia go

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through the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, where we are in touch with Boge Cadinovski, the adviser to the minister for refugees. We maintain permanent contacts with the city and republic Red Cross, two institutions who have a positive view on our work here, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia. However, the MVR rejected our demand to register, for which we filed a complaint. The complaint has not as yet been answered, and we have not received answers to the question of why and for what reason our specific activities which, allegedly, violate the law, have led to a refusal to register," says Iktail.

The director of the IGASE office in Skopje also stated that in addition to refugees—some 2,000 of them registered for assistance by that humanitarian organization—residing in refugee camps and those living with families throughout the state, IGASE helps socially threatened citizens in Macedonia. "Let me mention that in recent months we provided blankets and food to the socially needy in some 20 villages in the Krusevo, Prilep, and Stip areas. A high percentage of those rural families are Orthodox Macedonians. This proves our impartiality in terms of the ethnic and religious affiliation of the threatened." Iktail further mentioned that IGASE has given aid to several medical establishments in Macedonia: blankets to the Clinic for Eye Diseases in Skopje, 10 tons of food to the dialysis hospital in Struga, a computer to the Skopje Lung Clinic, etc. It is expecting an answer from the Kozale clinic for children for the purchase of medical instruments for the hospital, costing about 27,000 German marks.

The people of IGASE are disappointed with the view of the MVR and the negative answer to their request for registration, above all because the MVR believes that their humanitarian activities in our country violate the law. The MVR emphasizes that that humanitarian organization does not meet the conditions for work in our country. Does this mean that the police have any specific data on IGASE activities violating the law? In that case this should be publicly announced and the humanitarian organization should be definitively refused hospitality. If not, the status of IGASE in our country should be determined sooner.

Instruction in Turkish at Pedagogical Academy

95BA0214B Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 23 Mar 95 p 9

[Article by B.J.: "Competition for Turkish-Language Teachers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Teaching the methods of Turkish language instruction is expected to begin on 1 October.* In the next few days, the Sv. Kliment Ohridski Pedagogical Academy Council will hold a session at which, among others, it is expected that it will issue a resolution on holding a contest for teachers for Turkish language methods. In practical terms, this will meet the demand of students of Turkish ethnicity, who are in the group for separate instruction and who, as of 1 October, will study subjects in their native language.

Until the beginning of the next school year, the concept on the training of teaching cadres, which does not contemplate the overall teaching of subjects in the language of the different ethnic groups but only instruction according to the methods, it is most likely that the academy will assume the commitment of the overall supply of teaching cadres in the Turkish language. Currently, some 15 students are in their first year of studies at the academy. They initiated the demand for instruction in the Turkish language. Bearing in mind that the resolution of the pedagogical academy applies to the organized instruction in the languages of the ethnic groups, it is naturally expected that similar demands will be voiced by members of the other ethnic groups in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Naturally, this will depend on having a sufficient number of students in the teaching group and the necessary professorial personnel to cover the stipulated subjects.

Government Use of Computers, Press Services

95BA0214E Skopje VECER in Macedonian 3 Mar 95 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Government With Terminals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently the so-called daily information service began to function in the government. It receives from all sides a variety of information on a daily basis, mainly from the domestic news agencies MAKFAKS and MAKPRES. It is expected that soon the service will request information provided by some foreign news services. The purpose is for the members of the government and the president to be informed faster about what is occurring in our country and throughout the world. After the news has been faxed, it is classified and selected depending on its content, and sent to the offices of individual ministries or the head of state.

In terms of the technical standards of this exchange of information and communications between the government and foreign countries, progress has been made with the installation of a small computer system which, for the time being, includes the Ministries of Science and Culture, the offices of the minister who speaks for the government, and the secretary of the government. The intention is that in the future the entire government will have terminals. The main communication, however, will be sent by fax and modem.

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Belarus Envoy: Russians May Patrol Polish Border

LD1706122695 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1000 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Georgiy Tarazevich, Belarus ambassador to Poland, has confirmed that Russian troops are on duty at Belarus's borders with Lithuania and Latvia. The ambassador did not rule out the arrival of Russian troops at border crossing points with Poland.

The ambassador said that for the time being Belarus could not afford to man the borders with the Baltic states, and that was why the Russians were there. This was also envisaged in the Belarus-Russian agreements. The Russians' presence is to be temporary.

[Begin Tarazevich recording; in Belarusian with superimposed Polish translation] Let's say in two or three years, when we have achieved stabilization on Belarus's borders, we will defend them ourselves, no two ways about it. [end recording]

Ambassador Tarazevich ends his diplomatic mission to Poland today. He found out about his recall from the Polish press. In his opinion, the main reason for his recall by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka was the ambassador's participation in the parliamentary elections. Ambassador Tarazevich's views were not in line with the president's. He came out against the referendum held in Belarus halfway through May. In contrast to the Russian-speaking Lukashenka, Tarazevich makes his public statements almost exclusively in Belarusian.

Visit by German Foreign Minister Assessed

WS1906102895 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17-18 Jun 95 p 4

[Commentary by Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk: "Goals and Arrangements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There are certain limits to Germany's support for Poland's strategic goals. As Klaus Kinkel, head of the diplomatic service of the Federal Republic of Germany, assured during his visit to Poland, Germany will do its best to help Poland join the EU and NATO. However, the assistance will be limited by political common sense. "We will not jeopardize our good relations with other countries," Kinkel said in an interview for Polish television.

"What is the situation really like, then? Are they supporting our efforts or not?" ask Poles, who are discouraged by the fact that similar words have been repeated for a few years now.

Everyone realizes that it is a victory to have such an ally as Germany on one's side. However, it is only half a victory, and perhaps even less.

Our success will be determined first of all by efforts made by our diplomatic services, as well as by the effectiveness of our reforms and of the democratic transformations. Thus, the most important thing is what signals are sent from the country on the Vistula River to our partners, especially those whose support is yet to be obtained. For quite a long time now, Poles have felt a distaste for themselves. In such a case, how are we going to win the support of foreign politicians and the foreign press? Poles, who are busy setting up more and more political entities, are gradually losing sight of the goals which they keep talking about; they are not making any efforts to achieve them.

If the West says that decisions have already been made, and when EU and NATO expand, Poland will be one of the first beneficiaries of this process, it is not only an important signal, but also a real and very advantageous political situation. Everything seems to indicate that there will not be a better situation for Poland.

Calling politicians to account for their efforts to achieve the most vital national goals, as well as verifying the usefulness of their parties in putting those goals into effect, will make it easier for us to answer the following question: Who should be president, who should be in the government, and who should be in the parliament?

Constitutional Body Debates Presidential Powers

WS1906100495 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 16 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by Piotr Zaremba: "The President's Alimonies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputies and senators from the Constitutional Commission voted for four hours yesterday on a chapter of the new constitution on presidential powers. A heated debate took place on whether the president may appoint his own ministers and whether he can be sued in court for alimony.

Although the suggestions presented by [Deputy Sejm Speaker] Cimoszewicz, advertised by the author as the most restrictive for the prerogatives of the head of state, the final version is not very auspicious for the president. Walesa's representatives were very dissatisfied. "We are faced with the threat of a tyranny of the Sejm," said Professor Andrzej Rzeplinski.

Although Cimoszewicz did not succeed in having the presidential right of veto overruled, it was decided—with 20 votes for and eight against—that an absolute majority in the Sejm will suffice to override it. The president has a choice between vetoing resolutions and sending them to the Constitutional Tribunal. His powers of obstructing drafts are seriously diminishing.

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Moreover, if the president absolutely refuses to sign a resolution, the speaker of the Sejm will do it by the very virtue of his office. As we may remember, Walesa had announced nothing would compel him to sign a resolution permitting abortion, and he is prepared to stand before the Constitutional Tribunal for that. This will no longer be either necessary or possible.

Many changes have been introduced as far as the president's ties to the Armed Forces are concerned. In 1992, when the small constitution was passed, few deputies supported the provision that "the president commands the Armed Forces through the minister of defense." As a result, Walesa claims he has a right to maintain contacts with the military on his own. Moreover, the small constitution gave the president the right to appoint the head of General Staff "in agreement with" the defense minister. The head of state could thus suggest his own candidate.

The Commission has ruled that the president can command the Armed Forces only "in liaison with the prime minister and the defense minister." Because the provision that the president approves the heads of the Ministry of National Defense [MON], the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will most probably be overruled, there will no longer exist any reason to treat MON as a "presidential" ministry.

On the motion of Krystyna Lybacka (Democratic Left Alliance), it was decided that the head of the General Staff is to be appointed by the president at the prime minister's motion. The very special ties between the "top military official" and the head of state will thus disappear—[head of General Staff] General Wilecki is currently Walesa's man.

The most heated debate broke out on the issues of the presidential ministers and the head of state's liability to courts of law.

When the Commission rejected a draft that empowered the president to appoint secretaries of state (leaving him only with the power to appoint the head of his Chancellery), Krzysztof Kaminski (Confederation for an Independent Poland) asked: "Does that mean that the head of state will not be able to appoint state officers ranked as ministers?"

"It will be possible because the president can confer ministerial titles on the officers of his Chancellery," Prof. Rzeplinski stubbornly claimed. "It will not be possible; the Commission's decision is categorical," retorted experts.

"Does that mean that the president will not be represented by secretaries of state?" asked a few deputies in fear. "No, although he can call the employees of his Chancellory whatever he wishes," said Janusz Szymanski (Union of Labor). "He can even call them chamberlains," added Jerzy Ciemniewski (Freedom Union). Part of the Commission demanded that the vote be repeated, but the motion was overruled by one vote.

The scope of the president's responsibilities was hotly debated. His representatives suggested that the head of state should not be liable to any court (not even civilian), and he should be legally responsible only to the State Tribunal.

"What if the president has an illegitimate child?" asked presidential expert Profesor Michal Pietrzak to the amusement of the members of parliament. "He cannot be taken to court."

"Why not? That would be an alimony case and a child cannot wait!" said an outraged Alicja Grzeskowiak. "Ms. Senator, have mercy!" The chairman of the Commission covered his eyes. The presidential draft was overruled with four votes for and 16 against.

Security Head: Ex-Minister Knew of Arms Sale

LD1606195195 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 16 Jun 95

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] Henryk Goryszewski, head of the National Security Bureau [BBN], has said that the sale of 52 armored personnel carriers to an African country took place in accordance with the law and with the consent of the then-national defense minister, Piotr Kolodziejczyk. On 12 June, Admiral Kolodziejczyk said the sale took place without his knowledge and incurred losses for the state:

[Correspondent Bogdan Ulka] Minister Goryszewski believes that the carriers were sold profitably, and at least one deputy defense minister, as well as Minister Kolodziejczyk himself, knew about the sale:

[Begin Goryszewski recording] Minister Kolodziejczyk was probably informed about this on five occasions; the probably refers to the number of occasions. Furthermore, I have seen a document on which Minister Kolodziejczyk wrote on 18... [pauses] well, in October 1994, that according to him, everything appeared to comply with the law. [end recording]

[Begin Kolodziejczyk recording] This case was never reported to me. Had it been, the whole issue would not have arisen. I hope that the appropriate commission which is going to deal with the whole issue of arms trade will establish where the truth lies. [end recording]

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[Correspondent] Minister Kolodziejczyk maintains that he learned about the sale from military counterintelligence, which, while providing security for the meeting between the president and generals at Drawsko [Pomorskie training ground], accidentally overheard a conversation about the sale of the carriers between the chief of the General Staff and the head of the State Protection Office [UOP]. In view of this, Henryk Goryszewski has asked the minister of justice to establish who was guilty of eavesdropping on conversations between top state officials and to ascertain who gave the instruction to install the wiretapping equipment.

Controversial Arms Sale Viewed

WS1606132695 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 16-18 Jun 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Colonel L. Szczerba: "Controversial Transaction"]

[Translated Text] The Team for Special Turnover of the Social and Defense Committee at the Council of Ministers met on 14 June to discuss the legality and purpose of the sale of 52 BMP-2 armored personnel carriers to an African state.

As POLSKA ZBROJNA was told by Brigadier General Henryk Mika, head of the Department of Arms and Military Equipment, the civilian administration of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] has known about the whole issue for at least two years. It is thus surprising that former Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk stated the transaction was carried out without his knowledge or approval. General Mika refused to say what specifically was discussed at the meeting and what conclusions were reached. He said a special public statement would explain that. It is true, however, that the troublesome "bequest" has been discussed for some time now and various solutions for getting rid of the problem were considered.

"The Armed Forces do not trade arms, and 'getting rid of' the controversial carriers was absolutely legal and did not violate any regulations," spokesman of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Lieutenant Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda explained once more.

It seems it will take time to settle the issue definitely, and it might yet make the headlines several times. Head of the Sejm National Defense Committee Jerzy Szmajdzinski is also demanding an explanation and claims the Supreme Chamber of Control should investigate.

We have already cooled down enough to answer some of the questions raised by the press, most of all clarify certain statements that were injust to the military.

What did the readers of GAZETA WYBORCZA, RZECZPOSPOLITA, or ZYCIE WARSZAWY—to name just the central dailies—learn? The reports they carried give more or less the following picture—the ever more impoverished Armed Forces, "oppressed" by budgets that condemn them to an agonizing struggle for survival, are getting rid of the most modern combat technology, thus inflicting financial harm on themselves. The military administration and the head of General Staff are involved in the scandalous transaction.

The transaction was illegal, carried out without the defense minister's knowledge. Vice Admiral Kolodziejczyk alleges that corruption may have been involved.

A secret? The question is surprising, to say the least. "Nonsense," say high-ranking officers from the MON administration and the General Staff.

It should be clearly stressed once again that the Armed Forces do not engage in the arms trade. Civilian structures within MON are responsible for that and it is up to them, not the military, to decide who is to finalize transactions.

There should not be any doubts about this. An instruction issued by the defense minister in 1973, together with later amendments (which still remain effective), authorizes the head of General Staff only to withdraw certain types of weaponry and military equipment from the Armed Forces inventory.

Then why were half a hundred BMP-2's "withdrawn from the inventory"? There are several reasons for that.

First of all, it was impossible to furnish the land troops with the vehicles on a wide scale due to a lack of financial resources. There would be no chance of doing that over the next few years.

Second, maintenance costs proved extremely high and would clearly rise in the future. The main factor is ammunition for the BMPs that is not produced domestically.

Third, servicing and spare parts were lacking—a fact the technical staff responsible for maintenance and ensuring combat readiness of the vehicles could speak volumes about.

Fourth, special training programs would have to be designed for a small group of specialists, in particular for operators and gun commanders.

Fifth, a special infrastructure would have to be set in place, requiring that fire training centers be furnished

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with expensive training equipment for the sake of serving a mere several dozen BMP-2's.

"The allegation that they were sold at a loss," said an insider at the General Staff, "seems greatly exaggerated. The highest possible price was negotiated. Our Eastern neighbors asked much less for the same type of vehicle." The dollars that were earned (Minister Okonski spoke of five million) were not used to refurbish the generals' offices, but for purchases of equally modern arms and equipment of domestic make. This can be easily verified.

The taxpayer whose money is spent on defense wants to know the truth. Seeing how much public attention the whole issue attracted, it will probably be clarified soon. But that is no longer the Armed Forces' problem. They need not worry about who eavesdropped on whom, what sort of information was relayed, or who was selected as the most trustworthy middleman to carry out the whole operation.

It is difficult to avoid thinking that the Armed Forces are being drawn into the very heart of a plot we do want to have anything to do with. The Armed Forces want more than just to train and implement the defense objectives provided for in the military doctrine. [as published]

Daily on Dismissal of Military Audit Chief

WS1606145895 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 16 Jun 95 p 1

[Commentary by Piotr Zaremba: "State Within A State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel Dziedzic was recalled from the Supreme Chamber of Control by the very institution he was to oversee: the Ministry of National Defense [MON]. One cannot but admire the man who undertook the effort of violating a taboo. MON and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have always been a "state within a state" of sorts. Both ministers represent their ministries before the state much more gladly than they represent the state before their ministries. The services they supervise do not quite understand why anyone would claim they have a right to interfere with their activities. Arguments such as "taxpayers' money" or "public opinion" sound like Chinese to them.

Certain mechanisms were not in Dziedzic's favor. Representing an internal auditing institution, he was simultaneously an officer at the disposal of his former superiors. His merits are all the greater as he chose basic principles over the superficial solidarity within the ministry. The conditions in which he had to work were all the more absurd.

Under the circumstances, it is difficult to imagine that any problems could be solved or that dubious transactions or plane trips paid for with the taxpayers' money could be explained. It is also unlikely that the Polish Armed Forces could be pried open not by an enemy, but by citizen control.

This is not what President Walesa or his men—[Defense Minister] Zbigniew Okonski and [head of General Staff] Tadeusz Wilecki—want. Ensuring the so-called cadres that nothing will change, they are counting on securing their loyalty. Besides, they reap profits from keeping things as they are. Neither does the current governing coalition want change. It is far easier to be sycophantic toward the military on the eve of the elections than try to make the interests of the Armed Forces meet with those of the whole nation.

Military Bugging Powers Described, Questioned

WS1906093795 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Jun 95 pp 1, 15

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "Military Information Services—Office of State Protection; Bugging Outside Control"; all quotation marks as published]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is the military sector that decides whether the Military Information Services [WSI] should plant a bugging device somewhere; previous prosecutors general have left these decisions up to the chief military prosecutor. [Justice] Minister Jaskiernia intends to change this practice.

Revealing certain details on the "counterintelligence protection" issue of the military cadre session in Drawsko Pomorskie, former Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk confirmed information which some politicians had only guessed was true because there was no concrete evidence: The WSI is bugging conversations carried over cellular phones, including those of the head of the Office of State Protection [UOP], Kolodziejczyk, who allegedly found out about the sale of infantry combat vehicles.

"Any major exercises of the Armed Forces or sessions of the commanding cadres are accompanied by simultaneous operational activities of WSI. This is the so-called counterintelligence protection of a given event. This means that WSI is controlling the entire area, all persons, as well as all the information that is received or sent over the radio waves," Kolodziejczyk explained. "WSI checked how the information on what happened during the Drawsko meeting leaked to the press. In his report, Commander Marek Glowacki, who was the head of the military counterintelligence services at that time, informed that when the services were investigating the leak, they came across a recording of a conversation carried over a cellular phone by General Czempinski, UOP

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head; and Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The conversation was intercepted by military special services.

Is it really so that "counterintelligence protection" justifies planting bugging devices which normally must be preceded by a very strict procedure?

Colonel Wlodzimierz Pospiech, press spokesman of the chief military prosecutor, told RZECZPOSPOLITA that he does not rule out instituting explanatory proceedings in this case. "For the time being, however, we only have press reports. We would certainly take a closer look at the case if the persons directly involved—Gen. Czempinski and Gen. Wilecki—sent information to us. Then it would be appropriate to shed light on another issue of a legal nature—violating the secrecy of correspondence by disseminating the content of the conversation by the two generals over a cellular phone."

"I am surprised that the former defense minister revealed the content of the telephone conversation," RZECZPOSPOLITA was told by Lieutenant Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, press spokesman of the chief of the General Staff. However, on 14 June he had not had the time yet to ask Gen. Wilecki whether he thought the law had been violated and whether he would inform a prosecutor's office about it.

In line with relevant laws, services subordinated to the internal affairs minister (UOP and police) must have permission of the minister and the prosecutor general to plant bugging devices and to use other operational techniques [srodki techniki operacyjnej]. The WSI, on the other hand, must have the consent of the national defense minister and the prosecutor general. The powers to sign documents permitting the planting of bugging devices have been delegated by the prosecutor general to his deputies: the one who supervises the work of the public prosecutors' offices and the chief military prosecutor. Currently the persons who have these powers are Jozef Piechota (previously Stanislaw Iwanicki) and the chief military prosecutor. Thus, legal operational techniques used by the WSI are controlled exclusively by the military section.

"I personally familiarize myself with every motion requesting the use of operational techniques signed by prosecutor Piechota," Jerzy Jaskiernia told RZECZPOSPOLITA. "Now that the problem has surfaced, I am planning to change the decision made by my predecessor in office. I will also introduce a principle which will obligate the chief military prosecutor to present me with motions signed by him, requesting permission to plant a bugging device, for instance."

Asked whether he thought that it was not against the law to listen in on the telephone conversation in Drawsko and then to reveal its content, Minister Jaskiernia replied that it would be better if the persons involved sent information to a prosecutor's office; however, he said, it is possible to institute legal proceedings on the grounds of press reports. The minister is convinced that the chief military prosecutor will submit appropriate documents to me.

While UOP is controlled by the internal affairs minister, the Political Advisory Committee, and by the Sejm Commission of Administration and Internal Affairs (and despite that, opinions are frequently expressed that the control is insufficient), WSI is hidden behind the chief of the General Staff, to whom they are directly subordinated; they are practically outside civilian control. Such control cannot be fully guaranteed by the National Defense Commission, which does not have sufficient powers. Also, a Sejm commission for the special services has not been set up yet. Work is already under way and discussions are being held with the various deputies clubs to specify the composition of the commission. There is no law on WSI yet, either. Meanwhile, the recent amendment of the so-called police draft laws as well as extension of UOP's operational powers, if passed, will automatically equip WSI with the same powers.

Effects of New Tariffs on Imported Foodstuffs

WS1906090195 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 16 Jun 95 p 20

[Article by Monika Dzierzynska-Nowak: "On 1 July New Tariffs; Will Food Prices Go Up or Not?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new tariffs will not cause food prices to go up, the Agriculture Ministry assures. Higher custom duties will be offset by numerous product quotas, in which the duty paid on imported goods will be the same as it is today.

Right now the average tariff on food and agricultural products is 19.52 percent. After 1 July it will go up by approximately 3.85 percent, Deputy Agriculture Minister Ryszard Smolarek said at a press conference on 14 June. In line with the ministry's calculations, if last year's total imports are looked upon as 100 percent, then tariffs on approximately 45 percent of imported goods will remain the same. Tariffs on approximately 36 percent of the food items will be lowered; the lower tariffs will include coffee, tea, melons, watermelons, cotton, and oil seed cakes.

"Higher tariffs will be imposed only on a small group, approximately 19 percent, of goods that are considered

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to be the most vulnerable in the Polish agricultural sector," Deputy Minister Smolarek said.

Vulnerability of Eggs

"Vulnerable" products are, among others, beef, pork, honey, eggs, alcohol, tobacco, and tobacco products. When the new tariff rates come into effect, the duties paid on these goods will reach the maximum level specified in the Uruguay Round of GATT.

For example, if currently the tariff rate on poultry is 30 percent, it will go up to 60 percent. The 30-percent tariff rate on butter will increase to 160 percent on 1 July.

"These high tariffs will, in fact, not be applied," Deputy Minister Smolarek explained. "These are the so-called tariff rates that are to be 'bound'—that is, we have committed ourselves to not raising them any more, but to lowering them—by approximately 36 percent a year until 1996. The import of goods where these tariffs apply will be based on product quotas, where today's duties will be paid."

Product Quotas To Sweeten the Pill

The government has also specified what importers will be allowed to import at lower tariff rates. The list comprises, among others, 26,000 tonnes of poultry meat, 5,280 tonnes of frozen beef, 3,300 tonnes of wheat and rye and wheat flour, 1,000 tonnes of tomato concentrate, and 3,500 hectoliters of wine.

"Only when these products have been used up will the new import tariff come into effect," the Agriculture Ministry announced.

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'Secret' Stipulation Planned for Hungarian Treaty

AU1906114395 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 16 Jun 95 p 4

[Article by Andra Manta: "The Parties Belonging to the Ruling Coalition Decided To Annex a Secret Additional Letter to the Basic Treaties With Hungary and Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The principal issue tackled on 14 June at the Victoria Palace during Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu's talks with leaders of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], PRM [Greater Romania Party], and PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], was one of the basic treaties Romania intends to sign with Hungary and Ukraine.

An agreement was reached among the PUNR, PSM, and PDSR, as well as Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, to change the negotiation strategy of the treaty with Hungary. Considering that on the international plane both Hungary and Romania are subjected to massive pressure to sign the basic treaty, the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry is to adopt a categoric stance and will propose to Gyula Horn's government that an additional letter should be annexed to the treaty. The letter would have the same juridical value as the treaty itself. The additional document is to stipulate that, regardless of the international documents to be ever adopted by international bodies, Hungary will never come up with territorial claims with respect to Romania and will never request additional rights for the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania. Besides all this, it was decided that Romania should not accept the inclusion of [Council of Europe] Recommendation 1201 in the text of the treaty.

The participants in the meeting termed the treaty with Ukraine as even more complicated than the one with Hungary, as Ukraine insists that the very first point of the bilateral treaty should stipulate that Romania should decline any future claims regarding the Northern Bucovina and the Herta Province regions.

PUNR Says Territorial Integrity 'in Danger'

AU1706144595 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] faxed us an eight-point communique, which points out, among other things, that the draft basic political treaty, currently being negotiated by Romania and Hungary, is also based upon and includes Council of Europe Recommendation 1201, as well as the claims of Hungary and the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania].

The PUNR also draws attention to several ambiguous formulations that cropped up during the recent negotiation rounds.

The communique also says that, quote, it is regrettable and humiliating for Romania's Parliament to accept, upon Hungary's and the UDMR's request, that Chapter 12 should be included in the draft education bill, as this is stipulated by the Romanian-Hungarian draft treaty, unquote.

Assessing that the territorial integrity of the Romanian state, as well as Romania's future are in danger, the PUNR reiterates its proposal forwarded to President Ion Iliescu and requests that he should organize a meeting at Cotroceni Palace with the delegations of the political parties represented in Parliament to discuss the Romanian-Hungarian draft treaty.

The PUNR also reasserts its readiness to contribute actively to the negotiating and conclusion of the Understanding, Cooperation, and Good Neighborliness Treaty between Romania and the Hungarian Republic, abiding by Romania's Constitution, the Strasbourg Framework Convention [on the protection of ethnic minorities], and the interests of the Romanian nation.

The communique is signed by PUNR President Gheorghe Funar.

Police Monitor PKK Meeting in Satu Mare

AU1806123995 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 13 Jun 95 p 8

[Article by Radu Tudor: "In the First Days of June, the Members of the PKK Terrorist Organization Held a Meeting in Satu Mare"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the first days of June, in the town of Satu Mare, a meeting took place of certain members of the PKK [Workers Party in Kurdistan], who are residents of both Romania and foreign countries. The PKK is a terrorist organization fighting for the independence of Kurdistan, a region that is currently a part of the territories of Iraq and Turkey. The PKK also has a branch in Romania.

The meeting was attended by a PKK leader who currently lives in exile.

The entire event took place under the surveillance and successful control of the Satu Mare County Police Inspectorate, as well as the Satu Mare Intelligence Branch of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service].

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Defense Hotline Set Up in Bucharest, Budapest

AU1806124095 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 14 Jun 95 p 8

[Article by Constantin Vultureanu: "The 'Hotline' Linking the Romanian and Hungarian Defense Ministers Becomes Operational"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "hotline" linking the Romanian and Hungarian defense ministers has become operational. Thus, the two defense ministers, Gheorghe Tinca and Gyorgy Keleti, will be able to establish contact if any problems should arise.

It is worth noting that, despite certain disputes on the political plane, the military relations between the two countries are more than just cordial.

Delegation's Influence Needed To Amend Law

LD1606205495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Csaba Tabajdi, the political state secretary of the prime minister's office, has asked the foreign affairs delegation of the Romanian Senate and Chamber of Deputies to use its influence so that the Romanian education law, which is particularly disadvantageous for the Hungarian minority, can be amended.

At their meeting in Budapest, Csaba Tabajdi reminded the Romanian politicians that the legal rule approved by the Romanian Senate made mother-tongue education for the minorities virtually impossible.

The head of the Romanian delegation believed that amendments were still possible before the law was promulgated, but the representatives of the Hungarian minority in Romania must also have a constructive approach to the issue.

Ethnic Germans Attack Minority Language Bill

LD1606185795 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1600 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The German Democratic Forum, which is the organization of the ethnic Germans in Romania, has expressed its concern about the education bill adopted by the Romanian Senate.

The forum chairman has called attention to the fact that the Senate decision runs counter to the centuries-old traditions of mother-tongue education for national minorities.

[Correspondent Tibor Bogdan] The Hungarian minority is not the only minority in Romania that considers the Romanian education bill unacceptable. Representatives of the Czech, Slovak, and German minorities have all issued statements protesting against its disfranchising regulations. They see the draft recently adopted by the Senate as a way of completely emaciating mother-tongue education.

What is more, this time even Gheorghe Funar [Cluj-Napoca mayor, president of the nationalist Romanian National Unity Party] agreed with the HDUR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania]. Funar, too, criticized sharply the minority-related clauses of the draft education bill, although in his view, the clauses negatively discriminated against the majority and provided privileges for the ethnic Hungarians.

Funar accused Prime Minister Gyula Horn of having offended the Romanian Parliament because, he said, Horn had asked Romanian President Iliescu during a telephone conversation to use his good offices in order to amend the document.

UDMR Says Draft Education Law 'Antidemocratic'

AU1706151895 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In a communique sent late last night to the ROMPRES agency, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] points out that the draft education law in the form recently passed by the Romanian Senate, quote, unequivocally curbs the rights of ethnic minorities and is at variance with both the Constitution and the European integration requirements, unquote.

According to ROMPRES, the communique also emphasizes the fact that, prior to 1989, the curbing of the education in the ethnic minorities' mother tongues used to be the most efficient means of achieving the assimilation of those minorities, a policy that is now also being promoted by the two parliament chambers, which intend to pass new discriminating measures to limit the access to mother-tongue education.

The communique cited by ROMPRES draws attention to the fact that the UDMR legislative initiative was not taken into account, although it was endorsed by the signatures of 492,000 citizens, and that the draft education bill, which should have formulated the juridical framework of the state and religious education in the languages of the ethnic minorities, actually contradicts the elementary logic of legislative regulations, as its stipulations deprive persons of their rights and acts as an instrument to openly curb education in the minorities' mother-tongues.

The UDMR cannot accept that the will of the community it represents should be totally ignored and, therefore, it will make use of every possible means to demon-

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strate the anticonstitutional and antidemocratic nature of this law to the domestic and international public, says the communique signed by UDMR President Bela Marko and sent to the ROMPRES agency late last night.

Ethnic Germans Attack Minority Language Bill

LD1606185795 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1600 GMT 16 Jun 95

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Federal

U.S. 'Trouble' on Funding Rapid Reaction Force

LD1606132495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1252 GMT 16 Jun 95

[Commentary by Vjekoslav Radovic—"pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, June 16 (TANJUG)—The United States has in only three weeks acted three times without consulting the concerned parties, and in this way once again caused trouble to the Security Council and its European allies.

First, it insisted on the bombing of Pale, which resulted in a 'hostage crisis.' Then, when everything was ready for voting on a resolution on sending new 'rapid reaction' troops to Bosnia, it suddenly remembered that somebody has to pay the bill.

As proposed by Butrus-Ghali and the authors of the resolution, Britain and France, the new force should be financed from the budget for the U.N. peacekeeping operations.

This means that, according to the existing formula, the United States would have to cover 31 percent of the cost of the operation.

As the United Nations has already spent 3.8 billion dollars on the peace operation in the former Yugoslavia (that began in 1992) and its results have so far been nil, the mild rebel [as received] on the Capitol Hill hardly came as a surprise.

The U.S. presidential campaign is already in full swing and the republicans, despite their general support of the war option in Bosnia, are using every opportunity to put a spoke in President Bill Clinton's wheels.

U.S. commentators and politicians have lately voiced the opinion that a U.S. involvement in Bosnia and financial expenses should be balanced with Washington's interests in the Balkans.

At the same time, there is a widespread feeling that the United States has 'no vital interests' in that part of the world.

Neither the initiators of the idea of a 'rapid reaction' force, France and Britain, nor U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali have calculated the cost of the operation as yet.

The U.N. Secretary General is expected to do that in the next few days because Russia and China have demanded it.

In a letter to the summit of the Group of Seven most industrialized nations that opened on Thursday in the Canadian city of Halifax, Butrus-Ghali said that a number of U.N. members did not meet their financial obligations toward the peacekeeping operations, and that the accumulated debts for the past several years amounted to 800 million dollars.

Butrus-Ghali said the organization would increasingly have difficulties in providing funds in such conditions, and proposed that the United Nations issue bonds to secure the necessary means.

French President Jacques Chirac has in the meantime discussed the issue with Clinton, and on Thursday met with Butrus-Ghali.

U.N. diplomats claim that Chirac had asked French Ambassador Jean Bernard Merimee to somehow make the resolution pass before his visit here, so that he could wear the laurels. He failed, however, and the resolution was adopted on Friday.

Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Sergey Lavrov has recently repeatedly stressed the danger that the letter of the resolution may be again reneged on or misused for attacking the Serbs.

We should take lessons from the recent crisis, when the implementation of fully legitimate decisions was not accompanied by consideration of possible consequences, Lavrov said.

This time we want to make sure that UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] 'rapid reaction' force will act within the existing mandate and that impartiality will be secured, Lavrov said.

Kontic, EU Envoy Discuss Cooperation, Sanctions

LD1606184995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1638 GMT 16 Jun 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 16 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic stated in Belgrade on Friday that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was interested in cooperating with the European Union on the footing of equality and to the mutual benefit.

Kontic said this in a talk with the head of the E.U. observer mission based in Zagreb, Ambassador Albert Turot, when he had received him in a farewell call.

Having recalled that the Yugoslav Government had accepted all E.U. plans, from the Cutilheiro plan to the plan of the "Contact Group," Kontic stressed that this was why Yugoslavia rightly expected the E.U. to raise an initiative for the may 1992 U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia to be lifted.

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At the talk during which the activity of the E.U. observer mission was reviewed, Kontic and Turot noted that the F.R. Yugoslavia had secured all the necessary conditions for the successful operation of this mission—the Yugoslav information secretariat announced.

It was also noted at the talks that the latest escalation of the Bosnia conflict was threatening the Balkan and a broader-based area.

The only resolution of the crisis in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia was in the reinvigoration of the peace process by means of political negotiations and through diplomacy, it was said at the talks between Prime Minister Kontic and Ambassador Turot.

Sainovic on Milosevic's 'Contribution' to Peace

AU1706195795 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 17 Jun 95

[Report by Ljiljana Raicevic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Raicevic] Deputy Federal Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, together with the business, cultural, and political representatives of Bor Municipality, visited Brus today. The reason for today's visit was the 70th anniversary of schooling in the region, as well as remembering the solidarity Bor citizens showed 10 yeas ago, when, on the initiative of the then mayor of Bor and now deputy federal prime minister, Nikola Sainovic, they collected their own resources to build a new school in the village of Osredci at the peak of Kopaonik Mount, at the place where the old school was demolished in a catastrophic earthquake in May 1980.

During today's visit, in the talks with top officials of Brus Municipality, speaking about the current political situation, Sainovic pointed out that all world political centers today stress the contribution of Yugoslavia which, with its principled support for peace, exerts efforts toward concluding the military conflict. The decisive contribution of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in the dramatic situation with the hostages is being particularly stressed, Sainovic said and added the following:

[Sainovic] If these great world centers really want peace, then I think that we have never been closer to the final solution of the peace process than today, and I believe that [words indistinct].

[Raicevic] Speaking about the current economic moment, Sainovic pointed out that a stable economic policy alone can bring stable production conditions, and any attempt at destabilizing dinar is doomed to fail as only a stable dinar represents the basis of the Yugoslav economy, Sainovic said and added the following:

[Sainovic] The only way out is to reduce prices, to sell products, to get the capital back into production, to set off to export however difficult the conditions may be. This is how we can keep a stable economy and solve the problems of every individual firm, as well the state in general.

[Raicevic] Deputy Federal Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic concluded his visit to Brus Municipality by viewing the school at Osredci on Kopaonik.

Jovanovic Discusses Bosnian Political Solution

'Foreign Factors Hinder Accord'

LD1706125395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1219 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, June 17 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said on Friday that a political solution to the Bosnian conflict would be much easier to find if it depended solely on the sides involved in it.

However, the sides are not alone. They depend on others. Especially the Muslims, who cannot lead a policy independently. Thus the achievement of a just and durable peace in former Yugoslavia by summary procedure is difficult, Jovanovic said in the 'Observer,' the most popular political program on Bulgarian Television.

Jovanovic said since the earliest efforts at peace in Bosnia—the plan of Portugal diplomat Jose Cutilheiro, the foreign factors that obstructed a peaceful solution, when peace had been so close, were identifiable.

In regard with the Contact Group plan, Jovanovic said Yugoslavia believed the plan could be a starting point for political talks, despite its faults.

We expect the Bosnian Serb leadership to finally understand that the plan offers enough for a basis on which to build a solution acceptable to all, said Jovanovic.

He said Yugoslavia would make no exception in relations with its neighbors, although the countries that took an impartial stand on the Yugoslav crisis were in a more favorable position.

Jovanovic said that in addition to Greece, Bulgaria had also taken a principled stand on non-interfering in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria had more than once shown a positive and bold position in regard to the Yugoslav crisis by supporting peaceful options and opposing foreign interference in the conflict, said Jovanovic.

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He recalled Bulgaria's stands that neighboring countries should not send their troops as part of the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia, that Bulgaria would not let its territory to be used for any foreign military action and intervention, and its opposition to the extension of the U.N. Security Council sanctions against Yugoslavia.

However, some countries still have a negative role in the Yugoslav crisis, such as Turkey and Albania. However, when the crisis in Bosnia is over and if they amend their stand, we might establish relations with them, said Jovanovic.

Disapproval of RRF

LD1606124395 Lisbon Radio Renascenca in Portuguese to Europe 1200 GMT 16 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have Belgrade's reaction to the UN decision. The republics of Serbia and Montenegro, which constitute the new Yugoslavia, think that the UN decision to send a multinational force to Bosnia will escalate the conflict. This is what Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic told us in an exclusive interview. Pedro Leal offered these details: [Leal] The Belgrade regime believes that sending a Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] to Bosnia will only escalate the conflict. In an interview with us, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic stated that the UN Security Council decision will in no way achieve peace in Bosnia:

[Begin Jovanovic recording, in English fading into Portuguese translation] More soldiers do not mean more peace, but possibly more war. The two sides should be dealt with the same way, as this is the only way to guarantee the safety of UN soldiers. [end recording] [passage omitted]

The Yugoslav foreign minister also told us that the 15 UN soldiers still being held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs may be released this weekend. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Muslim Military Offensive Condemned

LD1606143595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1419 GMT 16 Jun 95

[By diplomatic editor Zoran Jevdjovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 16 (TANJUG)—Belgrade most strongly condemns the latest offensive attempts by the Bosnian Muslims and stresses that this once more shows the Muslim Government's committment to war.

The Muslims are acting as they are not so much in the belief that they might score a military victory as in an effort to cause fresh bloodshed and civilian suffering, which, they believe, might at this critical moment provoke international forces to take action, discredit peace efforts and involve Yugoslavia in the conflict.

Diplomatic sources in Belgrade said UN and Bosnian Serb officials had in the earlier period repeatedly warned about Muslim preparations for an offensive and ignoring of all calls to refrain from any such step.

The U.N. Security Council was informed about the military preparations, which raised the question of whether the international community would use the opportunity, if fighting should escalate, to exert pressure and condemn those opting for war.

Bosnian Muslim Premier Haris Silajdzic is reported to have left Washington ahead of plan after spending six days there.

It is encouraging that top U.S. officials—particularly President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher—have told Silajdzic, at least in public, that the war option stands no chance.

According to news agency reports, other unidentified senior officials have also said that the United States is not willing to play the role of the savior if the planned large-scale Muslim offensive should end in a defeat and bloodshed.

Washington is therefore reluctant to support the latest Muslim military adventure at least because it may end badly for the Muslim Government.

There have also been speculations about a difference between the United States and European states on the participation of European 'rapid reaction' troops and their possible role in Bosnia.

The main obstacle this time was posed by the U.S. Congress, which raised the question of financing the operation.

Belgrade is again stressing the danger of further maintaining the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia because they stimulate radical forces, especially among the warring sides in Bosnia.

The rigid stand on the sanctions is one of the main reasons for the Muslim Government to believe that Western powers, and the United States in particular, are not ready to reach agreement with the Serb side, which, naturally, leads to the conclusion that all military actions on its part are welcome regardless of statements calling for a negotiation solution.

All this clearly indicates the necessity for lifting the sanctions and adopting a more realistic and equal treatment of the warring sides in Bosnia as the chief condition for a speedy solution of the crisis.

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Especially encouraging in this context was a statement by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter before the military committee of the U.S. Senate, in which he urged for a balanced and equal treatment of the Bosnian confronted sides, the respect of the ceasefire reached last winter through his mediation and the removal of the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

In his view, this would inspire both sides to adhere to their agreements.

Perisic Warns Serbs Against 'Romantic Emotions'

AU1606171995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 16 Jun 95

[Statement by General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, on the occasion of Army Day, 16 June; place not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today we celebrate the Yugoslav Army Day for the second time with the conviction that the best part of our glorious, military, and martial past has been built into a more secure and safer present and future for our people, particularly its youth.

The Serbian and Montenegrin people cherish freedom and justice, but they must not allow themselves to be misled by romantic emotions and (?real) historical events. This would be particularly dangerous at a time when defeated and backward elements are raising their heads in an attempt to square historical accounts and when the ranks of servants and losers are obediently rushing to cling to the skirts of the new international superpowers.

Citizens of Yugoslavia and members of the Yugoslav Army have a vital interest in peace and freedom, particularly at a time when peace is not only necessary, but also realistically possible. We soldiers know best what war brings and that is why we shall do everything to stop it from spreading to our homeland. We will do this by supporting the state policy and with the strength of our combat readiness that operates as a deterrent.

However, if, contrary to our wishes, war were to be forced on us, and if the vital interests of our people were to be threatened, the Yugoslav Army would know how to defend its people and its state. In the hope that our army will act as a barrier against all assaults and attacks and that it will secure prosperity, peace, and freedom for our citizens—particularly our youth—I congratulate you on Yugoslav Army Day.

Unification of Pale, Knin 'Difficult To Achieve'

LD1606172495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1501 GMT 16 Jun 95

[By Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 16 (TANJUG)—The adoption of a decision and a law on the unification of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Bosnian Serb Republic by the Bosnian Serb Assembly is estimated by informed circles as a goal which will be difficult to achieve.

In late May this year, the same decision was taken by the Serb Krajina Assembly, and, if one is to judge by these decisions, there are no more formal obstacles to the realization of this objective of Knin and Pale.

However, things are not that simple in reality, and circumstances are such that it is hardly likely that these decisions will be realized in the near future.

No-one is denying the legitimate aspirations of the Bosnian Serb Republic and Serb Krajina to join forces and defend their rights and interests. However, both time and circumstances are such that a unification, according to many unbiased opinions, would be equal to a poke in the eye of the international community.

It is believed, namely, that unification with the Bosnian Serb Republic would make Serb Krajina lose the little credibility it has won with such difficulty in the international negotiating process. Krajina has in fact for the first time won actual international recognition as an independent entity, which was practically confirmed with the Vance plan.

The international community interprets the two assemblies' decisions on unification primarily as turning their backs on the peace process, the Contact Group plan, and the platform for political negotiations between Knin and Zagreb.

Within that context, the essential question is how will Pale and Knin try to realize their decision on unification—through war or diplomacy and intelligence.

It is certain that no-one in the world will recognize the new integrated state. Moreover, if one is to judge by the two fundamental principles of the U.N. Security Council on new states, it is quite probable that the U.N., along the lines of Article 7 of the U.N. Charter, might use corresponding measures, and force even, to prevent something that is contrary to the world organization's regulations.

Circumstances are such, therefore, that both Knin and Pale can try to realize their decisions using the war

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option, although it is hard to believe that anyone would do that.

The wish to unite is human and understandable, according to some even legitimate, but under the current circumstances it is difficult to realize, and even politically tactless and diplomatically harmful.

In any event, it is the impression that these are rash decisions adopted by Pale and Knin, who seem not to hear the well-wishing voices of warning not only from Belgrade, but from the world as well.

Serbia

Milosevic on Developments in Bosnian Conflict

Expresses Concern About RRF

LD1706182695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1750 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 17 Jun (TANJUG)—Republic of Serbia President Slobodan Milosevic today received Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the UN secretary general, who has arrived in Belgrade with his associates, the office of the president of Serbia announced this evening.

At the center of this evening's talks was the current situation in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the steps which need to be taken in order to deescalate and halt the armed conflict in this region as an essential condition for the revival of the peace process.

President Milosevic expressed concern at the formation of the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] and warned Akashi of dangerous experiences. The only strategic issue for the Muslim leadership in recent years has been how to incite foreign military intervention against the Serbs, in other words, how to get someone else to come and win for them the war which they had lost. It has been shown that this aim was indeed the reason for the crimes which they committed against their own citizens in order to attribute the blame to the Serb side and provoke a reaction from the international community. There is no doubt that a repeat of such attempts can be expected in order to provoke the use of the Rapid Reaction Force. For the United Nations, therefore, the most important issue remains one of basic principle: the impartiality of the United Nations, in other words, the real essence of the UN mission. Adherence to that principle on the part of the international community in its attitude toward the Yugoslav crisis leads without doubt to peace, while equally, abandoning the principle of impartiality leads to the escalation of war. In this connection Yasushi Akashi expressed his firm belief in the impartial attitude of the UN mission toward the parties in the conflict.

It was stressed that effective efforts must be made in the direction of dissuading the warring parties from fresh armed confrontations and preventing the latest offensive by the Muslim forces, because it poses an immediate danger of escalation of hostilities and prolongation of the civil war.

It was stated that there is no other path to a final and stable peace than the path of reaching a just political solution through negotiations, which must—as a first and essential step—be preceded by a general cease-fire which will be established and monitored by the United Nations.

Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic also took part in the talks.

Urges Normalized UN Ties

LD1806201895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2009 GMT 18 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 18 (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic said Sunday that the release of the last group of U.N. peacekeepers, 26 of them, should be used for normalising relations between the Bosnian Serb republic and the United Nations.

A statement issued by the president's office said this moment of easing tensions should be used also for creating conditions for a normal functioning of the U.N. mission, this being vital for finally restoring peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The statement said Milosevic's special envoy Jovica Stanisic had informed the president that the release of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel captured by Bosnian Serbs had ended at 4 p.m. local time (1400 GMT) on Sunday.

The last group of peacekeepers released by Bosnian Serb authorities into Stanisic's custody includes 12 Canadian, three Dutch and two Czech peacekeepers as well as one peacekeeper from Kenya, Ghana, Belgium, Pakistan, Russia, Brazil, Nigeria, Finland and Jordan each.

The peacekeepers crossed into Serbia soon after 7 p.m. local time (1700 GMT) on Sunday.

The statement said President Milosevic had commended members of Serbia's state security service for performing their duty correctly.

Following U.N.-requested NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb lines at Pale, Bosnian Serb political centre, on May 25-26, Bosnian Serbs took prisoner 388 U.N. peacekeepers to prevent further bombing of their positions.

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Bosnian Serbs released the peacekeepers successively, at Milosevic's bidding.

Police Assist in Recruitment of Krajina Men

AU1806202295 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by D. Petrovic: "Fear of Night Visitors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—The news on the mobilization of people from the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] living in Belgrade, carried by NASA BORBA on 13 June and later by the BETA agency as well, was confirmed yesterday by volunteers working for the "SOS telephone for the victims of political, ethnic, national, trade union, and religious discrimination." Since the evening of 11 June, they have been contacted by about 15 people, mainly friends and relatives of the people who have been taken to the Croatian battlefields during the past three nights.

So far, they possess information about the rounding up of soldiers in Vojvodina, Belgrade, and Serbia on the basis of telephone calls and information received from the UNHCR. As for the report on the mobilization in Kosovo, they say they got it "secondhand," based on the story told by the wife of a man from Kosovska Mitrovica, who has nothing to do with the RSK except that he was in the war there as a volunteer. The policemen of the Serbian Internal Affairs Ministry apparently threatened him that "if he does not want to go, they will take his 16-year-old son to the front."

According to a story told by one woman, Serbian policemen carried out mobilization in Apatin as well. After her husband was taken away, the said lady called the police station and was told there that her husband was at the military department. There, at the department, she was told that everybody that had been "collected" was taken to the airport. At the airport, she was told that they had been "taken to Krajina by bus." One of the taken Krajina men called his family from Tenja, another from Knin, while the UNHCR possesses data about a man who called from Banja Luka from which, he said, he will go to Brcko. According to a report that NASA BORBA possesses, the wife of a Krajina man living in Belgrade was told that the people mobilized "are going somewhere toward Knin."

We have also learned from "SOS telephone" volunteers that the mobilization is carried out overnight. "Knocking" at the door are either civilians introducing themselves as workers of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in some cases Serbian policemen of the public security service (in uniforms), as well as "representatives"—that is, military policemen of the RSK. In one case, people were forcefully taken in a blue-white police car, in another case in a military "campanola" vehicle, while in most cases the vehicle used is not known.

In almost all cases, the explanation provided by the "night visitors" was that it is their duty to bring "XYZ" to the military department. What is interesting is that, as we have already written, the ones they take to the front are Krajina men with refugee status, residence visas, and even Yugoslav citizens originally from the territory of Krajina.

As lawyers working for the SOS telephone claim, the said events are contrary to the law and constitution. According to the International Convention on the Refugee Status and the Law on Refugees of the Republic of Serbia, the country that granted the person refugee status is obliged to guarantee that person's security. Even if somebody is denied refugee status, he cannot be returned against his will to the territory from which he fled if there is danger for him there (the very fact that he is a refugee means that he has fled some danger). It is said in an article in the federal Law on Defense and the Law on the Yugoslav Army that military obligation ceases with the loss of citizenship, so Yugoslav authorities cannot mobilize somebody who is not a "domestic" citizen, just as RSK bodies cannot mobilize Yugoslav citizens. Also, the constitutions of the FRY and Serbia guarantee "all persons on their territory the right to live."

We were told by the SOS telephone people that a similar mobilization was carried out in January 1994, but it lasted only two to three days until the world public reacted. The same is expected to happen now as well.

Serb Radical Party Protest Meeting Viewed

Seselj Release Demanded

LD1706142795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1351 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 17 Jun (TANJUG)—The Serbian Radical Party [SRS] held a protest meeting in the area in front of the Federal Assembly in Belgrade today at which federal and republic-based deputies of the party made speeches.

At the meeting, at which there were only about 2,000 citizens, which is significantly less than expected and less than the organizers had suggested there would be, a series of accusations and insults at the expense of the authorities and officials of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro were aired, in the Radicals' familiar style.

Speakers demanded the immediate release of SRS President Vojislav Seselj, Vice President Tomislav

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Nikolic, and other SRS deputies who are in prison because of the incident they provoked at a banned protest meeting in Gnjilane [Kosovo] at the beginning of the month.

They supported the announcements on the unification of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina, opposed the possible recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and called for "the unification of all Serb republics into a unified Serb state."

The protest meeting lasted two hours and concluded without incident.

Meeting Called 'Fiasco'

AU1706144695 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A two-hour meeting of the Serbian Radical Party was held in Belgrade in front of the building of the Federal Assembly. About 2,000 citizens participated at the meeting, which shows that this long-announced meeting of the Radicals was a fiasco and that Belgrade and Serbia do not support war, but peace. The meeting passed without incidents.

Milosevic Labeled 'Traitor'

AU1706124695 Paris AFP in English 1147 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 17 (AFP)—Several thousand protesters Saturday took part in a demonstration in the vicinity of the presidential residence, denouncing the policy of "treacherous" Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Deputies of the Serbian Radical Party, addressing a crowd before the parliament building here, called Milosevic a "traitor," and referred to his wife Mira Markovic, who is active in a small communist party, as "a red witch."

The demonstrators, only about 150 metres (yards) from the presidential residence, waved Serbian Radical Party banners and portraits of its two imprisoned leaders Vojislav Seselj and Tomislav Nikolic.

On June 3, Milosevic's regime sentenced the two to two months in prison after they took part in a banned demonstration which degenerated into clashes with police.

Vojvodina

Events in Hungarian Cause for Autonomy Viewed

VMSZ Forms Party

LD1706172795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 17 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Vojvodina Hungarians [VMSZ], which to date operated as an interest representation organization, has become a party. This was decided at the delegates' assembly, where the statutes were also adopted.

The party's goals are to represent the political interests of the Hungarians in Vojvodina, to preserve culture and identity, and to maintain contact between Hungarian groups.

According to Chairman Ferenc Csubela, the organization was set up a year ago because it was necessary to take over the Hungarians' interest protection from the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, which had come under left-wing influence.

VMSZ-VMDSZ Cooperation

LD1806172195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 18 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Vojvodina Hungarians [VMSZ] is ready to cooperate with the existing organization of the local Hungarians in Vojvodina, the Hungarian Democratic Community of Vojvodina [VMDSZ].

VMSZ Chairman Ferenc Csubela also said that his party is ready to discuss with the VMDSZ, as with any other body or individual, the situation of the school network and local self-government organizations as well as the cause of autonomy.

Regarding autonomy, Csubela said that the Hungarians in Vajdasag [Vojvodina] have never been closer to autonomy than they were now. The Hungarians of Vojvodina consider the self-government program offered by the states of the world to the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs to be perfectly acceptable for the Hungarian community too.

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